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Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.1 This inquiry is 
important and timely because third-party copyright cases have 
become high stakes affairs that potentially affect the viability 
of entire industries. Copyright holders worry that digital tech-
nology, particularly the Internet, will destroy the value of copy-
rights by facilitating rampant copyright infringement. Anyone 
with a personal computer can make perfect copies of copy-
righted works and post them on the Internet, making it possi-
ble for millions of people2 to download free copies of music and 
movies.3 Copyright holders believe that these free downloads 
 
 1. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
 2. Official statistics for Internet usage do not exist. The number of Inter-
net users worldwide now exceeds one billion. Internet World Stats, Internet 
Usage Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2006). According to the Computer Industry Almanac, worldwide Inter-
net users are projected to number nearly 1.8 billion by the end of the decade. 
Press Release, Computer Indus. Almanac Inc., USA Leads Broadband Sub-
scriber Top 15 Ranking (Nov. 14, 2005), http://www.c-i-a.com/pr1105.htm. 
 3. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) 
claims that the number of infringing music files available on the Internet fell 
slightly from 900 million in January 2004 to 870 million in January 2005. 
INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 23 (2005), 
http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/digital-music-report-2005.pdf; see also 
INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 16–21 
(2006), http://www.ifpi.org/library/digital-music-report-2006.pdf (describing 
file-sharing activity and industry efforts to curb it). Estimates of the impact of 
infringing downloads on music sales vary. See Stan J. Liebowitz, Will MP3 
Downloads Annihilate the Record Industry? The Evidence So Far, 15 AD-
VANCES STUDY ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION & ECON. GROWTH 229, 240–
51 (2004) (finding that alternative theories do not explain an obvious drop in 
record sales); Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet Piracy 
on Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence, 1 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT IS-
SUES 71, 75 (2004), available at http://www.serci.org/docs_1_2/waelbroeck.pdf 
(finding a twenty percent decrease in music sales due to file sharing); Rafael 
Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C’s: Music Downloading, Sales Dis-
placement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, 49 J.L. & 
ECON. 29, 53 (2006) (finding 0.2 lost album sales for each illegally downloaded 
album); Alejandro Zentner, File Sharing and International Sales of Copy-
righted Music: An Empirical Analysis with a Panel of Countries, TOPICS ECON. 
ANALYSIS & POL’Y, 2005, at 1, 5–6 (documenting a 6%–12% decrease in music 
sales due to file sharing, correcting for broadband penetration, per capita 
GDP, and other factors); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect 
of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis 4 (June 2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with The Minnesota Law Review), available at 
http://economics.missouri.edu/Seminars/PDF/strumpf.pdf (showing no effect 
on music sales). In regard to movie downloading, one source estimates that, in 
2005 alone, film studios lost $447 million as a result of illegal downloading in 
the United States. See Sarah McBride & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Studios See Big 
Rise in Estimates of Losses to Movie Piracy, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2006, at B1.  
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represent lost sales, and they understandably worry that their 
businesses will fail unless the downloads are stopped.4 
The normal remedy for copyright infringement is litigation 
against infringers. However, the number of computer-based in-
fringers is so large that copyright holders cannot find and sue 
them all.5 Copyright holders have therefore sued many provid-
ers of Internet-related technologies and services in an attempt 
to hold these providers liable for infringement committed by 
others. These actions include claims against Internet service 
providers, creators of file-sharing technology, search engine 
companies, venture capitalists, and credit card companies.6 The 
plaintiffs in these cases have typically argued that the defen-
dant should be held liable for someone else’s infringement be-
cause the defendant supported that infringement.7 
 
 4. Several artists have voiced this concern, including Steve Smith, singer 
for Dirty Vegas (“It’s having an effect on us as a new band. If you stop buying 
the CDs in the shops, then we don’t get to make the music.”), DMX (“[Piracy 
is] killing the industry as we know it. Stop stealing. Go in the store and buy 
like everybody else.”), and Luciano Pavarotti (“Artists and composers—
particularly the younger ones—will not stand a chance of creating music in the 
future if their recordings are simply stolen in this way.”). MusicUnited.org, 
What the Artists and Songwriters Have to Say, http://www.musicunited.org/ 
3_artists.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006). 
 5. See supra note 3 (discussing the wide availability of infringing music 
files available on the Internet). 
 6. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (third-
party copyright liability action brought against an Internet service provider); 
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (third-party 
copyright liability action brought against a peer-to-peer network creator); 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (third-
party copyright liability claim against the creator of a file-sharing network); 
Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (action against 
a search engine company for, among other things, third-party copyright liabil-
ity); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2006) 
(claims of primary and third-party copyright liability against a search engine 
operator); Newborn v. Yahoo!, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 181, 183–84 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(third-party copyright liability claim against the Yahoo! and Google search en-
gines); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, No. C 04-0371, 2004 WL 
1773349, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004) (third-party copyright liability suit 
against credit card companies that processed payments for businesses alleg-
edly committing infringement); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 
F.R.D. 408, 409 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (third-party copyright liability action against 
venture capitalists who funded a peer-to-peer technology provider); Religious 
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365–66 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (third-party copyright liability suit against an Internet ser-
vice provider); Complaint at 16, 34, 43, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., No. 
CV05-4753, 2005 WL 1935670 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2005) (third-party copyright 
liability claims brought against a search technology provider).  
 7. Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1074–75 (alleging that the defendant Internet ser-
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These lawsuits have proven controversial. On one hand, 
copyright holders have legitimate interests in preventing in-
fringement and receiving compensation for infringement. On 
the other hand, third-party defendants understandably wonder 
why they should pay for another person’s misbehavior. Indeed, 
defendants rightfully worry that liability could drive them out 
of business because the costs of Internet-related infringement 
could be enormous. It is not even clear where society’s best in-
terests lie. Third-party copyright liability benefits society by 
encouraging individuals to stop others from infringing, but 
those benefits come at a price because third-party defendants 
cannot focus precautions solely on infringers.8 Accordingly, 
third-party copyright liability suppresses noninfringing as well 
as infringing behavior. Society’s best interests therefore require 
some kind of balance between the desirable and undesirable 
consequences of third-party copyright liability, but it is not ob-
vious how that balance should be struck. 
To make matters worse, fundamental contradictions exist 
in the relevant case law. Before Grokster, courts took two dis-
tinct approaches to third-party copyright liability. Some ap-
plied such liability in a relatively limited way, while others ap-
plied it more expansively. This division rendered the law 
incoherent, and it polarized debate about third-party copyright 
liability because both sides could credibly claim that existing 
precedent supported their positions.9 
 
vice provider should be liable for providing subscribers with access to the 
USENET newsgroup, where infringing copies of the plaintiff ’s works were on 
display); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 645 (contending that the 
creation of the defendant’s file-sharing network establishes third-party copy-
right liability); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851–53 (arguing 
that the defendant Google should be held liable because it supports infringe-
ment by others); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799 
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (“[P]laintiffs allege that by investing in Napster and assum-
ing control of the operation of the Napster file-sharing network, the named de-
fendants contributorily and vicariously infringed plaintiffs’ exclusive rights 
under the Copyright Act.”); Visa, 2004 WL 1773349, at *2 (claiming that fi-
nancial services provided by the defendants to the infringers renders the de-
fendants liable for infringement); Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1365 
(alleging that the defendant Internet service provider should be held liable be-
cause the infringer gained Internet access through defendant’s system); Com-
plaint, supra note 6, at 34, 43 (alleging defendant’s support for copyright in-
fringement via search technology). 
 8. See infra pp. 213–14 (discussing the undesirable consequences of hold-
ing Internet service providers liable for their customers’ infringing activities). 
 9. See Craig A. Grossman, The Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability 
and Contributory Infringement: From Interstitial Gap Filler to Arbiter of the 
Content Wars, 58 SMU L. REV. 357, 378–95 (2005) (describing the expansive 
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Grokster gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to clarify 
third-party copyright liability law. The Grokster defendants 
distributed software that established peer-to-peer networks on 
the Internet.10 These networks allowed users to make any type 
of file available for others to download.11 The associated soft-
ware also allowed users to submit search queries to locate de-
sired files.12 In theory, the networks created by the defendants 
could have been used solely to exchange files that would not in-
fringe copyright. However, the vast majority of files exchanged 
over the networks turned out to be infringing copies of copy-
righted songs and movies.13 The Grokster plaintiffs owned the 
copyrights in many of the works most commonly shared over 
the defendants’ networks.14 They sued, arguing that the defen-
dants were liable for the infringement committed by the net-
works’ users.15 The district court decided the case in the defen-
dants’ favor at summary judgment on the ground that the 
noninfringing uses of the defendants’ network were sufficient to 
excuse the defendants from liability.16 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.17 
Predictably, both parties and numerous amici urged the 
Court to choose existing interpretations of law that favored 
their particular interests. The Court acknowledged the parties’ 
differing interpretations of the law, but it did not resolve the 
case by choosing between them.18 Instead, the Justices unani-
mously adopted a dormant theory of third-party copyright li-
ability—inducement—and used it to reverse the decision be-
low.19 According to the Court, noninfringing uses could not 
excuse a defendant from third-party copyright liability if the 
 
application of third-party copyright liability in the contributory infringement 
context); infra Part I (describing conflicting interpretations of third-party 
copyright liability). 
 10. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 
2770 (2005). 
 11. Id. at 2770–71. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. (“[A]lthough the [defendants’] networks . . . can be used to share 
any type of digital file, they have prominently employed those networks in 
sharing copyrighted music and video files without authorization.”). 
 14. Id. at 2771. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 
1029, 1035–36 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 17. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774–75. 
 18. Id. at 2778–80. 
 19. Id. at 2779–83. 
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defendant deliberately induced others to infringe.20 The Court 
identified enough evidence of such inducement by the defen-
dants to make summary judgment inappropriate,21 and re-
manded the case for further consideration.22 
Grokster is not a simple case. It initially appears to compli-
cate matters by endorsing inducement without explicitly resolv-
ing the conflicts in existing law. However, careful analysis of 
the conflicting theories that animate copyright liability shows 
that Grokster created an improved framework for future con-
struction of third-party copyright liability.23 
 
 20. Id. at 2779 (“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of 
intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose 
rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.” (citing Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984))). 
 21. Id. at 2780–83. 
 22. Id. at 2783. All nine Justices joined the opinion of the Court. Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer each wrote concurrences joined by two other Justices. 
Justice Ginsburg took the position that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony and 
that the evidence of noninfringing uses of the defendants’ networks was insuf-
ficient to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Grokster, 125 
S. Ct. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Breyer disagreed, stating 
that, but for evidence of deliberate inducement, the defendants should not 
have been held liable because their networks were sufficiently capable of non-
infringing uses. Id. at 2787–89 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 2788 
(“[T]he evidence now before us shows that Grokster passes Sony’s test—that 
is, whether the company’s product is capable of substantial or commercially 
significant noninfringing uses.”). 
 23. Not every commentator concludes that Grokster improved the law of 
third-party copyright liability. Professor Tim Wu argues that Grokster was 
wrong to introduce intent to copyright law, and that the social welfare costs 
and benefits of a defendant’s behavior should be the only determination con-
trolling third-party copyright liability. Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 
SUP. CT. REV. 229, 249–51. Professor Wu makes a provocative point, one that 
is consistent with the usual refrain that copyright functions solely as an incen-
tive for the production of creative works. E.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (stating 
that the copyright monopoly exists to advance the public interest by motivat-
ing the creative activity of authors); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) 
(emphasizing that the economic philosophy behind copyright law is to advance 
the public interest by encouraging individual effort). However, consistency 
with the primary justification for copyright is not, in and of itself, a sufficient 
reason to make considerations like a defendant’s intent irrelevant to the ques-
tion of third-party copyright liability. This is because such liability is not a 
“core” component of copyright. Third-party copyright liability entered copy-
right because courts analogized copyright to tort law. See infra note 24 and 
accompanying text (supporting the proposition that third-party copyright li-
ability arose from common law tort). It therefore makes just as much sense to 
prefer the basic principles of tort over those of copyright when constructing 
third-party copyright liability. As of now, matters of intent occupy a prominent 
place in torts, and there is no sense that courts are about to abandon the doc-
trines of intentional torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
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Courts consistently state that the doctrines of third-party 
copyright liability arose from common law tort.24 It therefore 
comes as no surprise that the most important theories of tort, 
fault and strict liability, shed considerable light on the con-
struction of third-party copyright liability.25 For example, third-
party copyright liability could be a matter of fault. If so, liabil-
ity exists because a defendant’s behavior is culpable or socially 
 
PHYSICAL HARM § 5 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (imposing liability for 
intentional causation of physical harm); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 13 (1965) (imposing liability for intentional causation of harmful or offensive 
physical contact). Granted, one could argue that tort law itself should abandon 
questions of intent in favor of a strict social cost-benefit analysis. However, 
that position remains controversial. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a 
Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 191 (1980) (arguing that wealth maximization 
alone cannot serve as an adequate governing principle for law); George P. 
Fletcher, Remembering Gary—and Tort Theory, 50 UCLA L. REV. 279, 282–89 
(2002) (reviewing debates between economic and corrective justice theories of 
tort and criticizing the economic approach to tort theory); Mark Geistfeld, Rec-
onciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety Matters More 
than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 146–47 (2001) (arguing that an altered 
cost-benefit analysis can compensate even the least compensable risks); David 
McCarthy, Rights, Explanation, and Risks, 107 ETHICS 205, 212–15 (1997) 
(arguing that wealth maximization can only be reconciled with individuals’ 
rights to be free of risks imposed by others where a social good sufficiently 
outweighs the infringement of these rights); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of 
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (proposing an economic theory of neg-
ligence); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979) (arguing that wealth maximization is the best 
governing principle for law); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possi-
ble End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 607–08 
(1992) (noting tension between ethical and economic approaches to tort law 
and the ability of the negligence standard to account for both). 
 24. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2767–68 (stating that doctrines of third-
party copyright liability emerged from the common law); A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[V]icarious copyright li-
ability is an ‘outgrowth’ of respondeat superior.”); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry 
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261–62 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The concept of vicarious 
copyright liability was developed in the Second Circuit as an outgrowth of the 
agency principles of respondeat superior.”); Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic 
Soc’y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 472–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (referring to common law 
tort origins of vicarious and contributory copyright liability), modified, 220 F. 
Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff ’d, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 25. Several other articles also explore insights derived from the connec-
tion between tort and third-party copyright liability. See Ronald J. Mann & 
Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 239 (2005); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for 
Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amend-
ment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833 (2000); Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the 
Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815 (2005) [hereinafter Yen, 
Peer-to-Peer]. 
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costly.26 Alternatively, the same area of law might involve strict 
liability. If so, liability exists because it encourages defendants 
to stop others from infringing and to raise compensation for vic-
tims of infringement.27 
Reference to tort clarifies the conflicting choices made by 
courts before Grokster. Some courts adopted a limited approach 
to third-party copyright liability because they were sensitive to 
its disadvantages.28 These courts generally preferred fault-
 
 26. This Article is not the forum for surveying the extensive jurisprudence 
of fault or settling theoretical and doctrinal debates about the subject. Never-
theless, it is appropriate to say a few words about the way this Article uses the 
term “fault.” Common law courts often use fault to identify the culpable behav-
ior that justifies a defendant’s legal liability for injuries suffered by another. 
Fault exists when the defendant’s behavior is unreasonable. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (stating that a person 
acts negligently if the person fails to exercise “reasonable care”); id. § 5 (impos-
ing liability for intentional causation of physical harm); id. § 6 (imposing li-
ability for negligent causation of physical harm); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 13 (imposing liability for intentional causation of harmful or offensive 
physical contact); id. §§ 283, 284 (describing negligence as a form of unreason-
able behavior); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (2000) (“In the great ma-
jority of cases today, tort liability is grounded in the conclusion that the 
wrongdoer was at fault in a legally recognizable way.”). Of course, a uniform 
definition for unreasonable behavior does not exist. However, judgments about 
the reasonableness of a defendant’s behavior often involve determinations 
about the defendant’s motivation for acting, the risks and benefits associated 
with the defendant’s behavior, and social custom. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 (stating that intent depends on the 
purpose of defendant’s action); id. § 3 (noting that the primary factors in de-
termining negligence are foreseeable likelihood of harm, foreseeable severity 
of potential harm, and the burden of precaution against harm); id. § 13 (de-
scribing the relevance of custom to the determination of negligence); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (stating that intent depends on the ac-
tor’s desire to cause the consequences of her act); id. § 291 (“[An] act is 
negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards 
as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.”). This 
Article’s use of fault encompasses all of these possibilities. 
 27. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972) (noting that re-
spondeat superior exists to internalize costs and spread loss); Riviello v. Wal-
dron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1280–81 (N.Y. 1979) (noting that respondeat superior 
exists out of concern for preventing injury, ensuring compensation, and 
spreading loss); see also Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law 
of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1267 (1997) (stating that strict 
liability is a form of enterprise liability); George L. Priest, The Invention of En-
terprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern 
Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 462–64 (1985) (connecting strict liability to 
enterprise liability). 
 28. The leading case articulating this view is Sony, 464 U.S. 417. See infra 
Part I.A and text accompanying notes 185–90 (discussing Sony and other cases 
taking a similar view); infra note 60 (listing cases that limit the scope of third-
party copyright liability). 
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based constructions of the law because determinations of fault 
often include a sophisticated balancing of social costs and bene-
fits.29 This approach made it possible to protect innocent defen-
dants from bearing responsibility for the misdeeds of others 
while limiting liability to situations where the benefits out-
weighed the costs. By contrast, other courts expansively ap-
plied third-party copyright liability because they considered the 
prevention of infringement paramount.30 These courts fre-
quently adopted strict liability constructions of the law because 
they saw little need to balance the social costs and benefits of 
liability. They also expansively interpreted the law to prevent 
cynical, faulty defendants from exploiting doctrinal ambiguity 
to escape liability, even if this meant exposing innocent defen-
dants to unwarranted liability.31 
Grokster addressed these conflicting choices in two ways. 
First, Justice Souter’s opinion of the Court referred repeatedly 
to concepts of fault, justifying inducement on the ground that 
those who want to cause infringement are culpable.32 Indeed, 
the Court’s preference for fault was so strong that the Court 
subtly restated the formulation for vicarious liability to exclude 
strict liability.33 This established fault as the dominant theory 
of third-party copyright liability and cast doubt on strict liabil-
ity interpretations of the law. 
Second, Grokster ’s adoption of inducement greatly reduced 
the justification for expansively interpreting pre-Grokster doc-
trines of third-party copyright liability. As noted earlier, ex-
pansive liability ensures that culpable defendants do not escape 
liability, but it also risks holding innocent defendants liable for 
the behavior of others and suppressing noninfringing behavior. 
This Article will show that inducement gives courts a new tool 
for holding culpable defendants liable while reducing the risk of 
undesirable side effects.34 Future courts should therefore apply 
 
 29. See supra note 26 (discussing fault); infra text accompanying notes 
185–90 (discussing cases that narrowly interpret third-party copyright liabil-
ity). 
 30. The leading case articulating this view is Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auc-
tion, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). See infra Part I.B and text accompany-
ing notes 191–202 (discussing Fonovisa and other cases taking a similar view). 
 31. See infra Part I.B and text accompanying notes 191–202 (discussing 
cases that expansively interpret third-party copyright liability). 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 218–24 (analyzing Grokster ’s refer-
ences to fault). 
 33. See infra text accompanying note 235 (quoting Grokster). 
 34. See infra Part IV (arguing that Grokster ’s inducement analysis offers 
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pre-Grokster doctrines cautiously to minimize those undesir-
able side effects while judiciously using inducement to make 
sure that the most culpable defendants face liability. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the doc-
trines that governed third-party copyright liability before Grok-
ster. This description shows that courts generally interpreted 
those doctrines with fairly well-articulated limits, and that a 
few courts disregarded these limits in order to apply third-
party copyright liability expansively. Part II uses fault and 
strict liability to expose the theoretical and practical tradeoffs 
implicit in these differing constructions of the law. Next, Part 
III analyzes the Grokster case and its use of fault to explain 
third-party copyright liability. Part IV describes the implica-
tions of Grokster ’s reliance on fault and sets forth the general 
contours of an improved, post-Grokster construction of third-
party copyright liability. The Article concludes in Part V with 
some thoughts about the future of third-party copyright liabil-
ity. 
I.  THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY  
BEFORE GROKSTER   
Two causes of action derived from tort, contributory copy-
right liability and vicarious copyright liability, governed pre-
Grokster third-party copyright liability. Courts developed these 
doctrines along two distinct lines. Most adopted a relatively 
limited interpretation of the law, imposing third-party copy-
right liability only on defendants who had close relationships 
with primary infringers. A smaller number of courts applied 
third-party copyright liability more expansively, imposing li-
ability on a wide range of defendants, including those who had 
relatively remote relationships with copyright infringers. This 
Part surveys the relevant case law. 
A. THE LIMITED INTERPRETATION OF CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY 
AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
1. Contributory Copyright Liability 
Courts routinely cite Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Colum-
bia Artists Management, Inc. for the proposition that “one who, 
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or 
 
an improved construction of third-party copyright liability). 
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materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, 
may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”35 This defini-
tion includes the word “induces,” a term which carries great 
significance after Grokster. However, the leading elaborations 
of contributory liability before Grokster did not analyze the 
meaning of inducement. They described instead the type of 
knowledge and material contribution required to establish li-
ability.36 
The intuition expressed by contributory liability is simple. 
If a person knows that another is committing copyright in-
fringement, it is arguably wrong for that person to assist the 
infringer. That intuition does not, however, define the level of 
knowledge or assistance necessary to create legal liability for 
another’s infringement, for different types of knowledge and 
assistance imply very different results. Consider first a defen-
dant who sells custom-length blank cassette tapes to a person 
he knows will use the tapes to make unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted music for sale to the public.37 This seller is quite 
 
 35. 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted); see also Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–38 (1984); 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001); Fono-
visa, 76 F.3d at 262; Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); Too, 
Inc. v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 138, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Costar 
Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 696 (D. Md. 2001), aff ’d, 373 
F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 
1455–56 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Ez-Tixz, Inc. v. Hit-Tix, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 728, 732 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 
1314, 1320 (D. Mass. 1994); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 
542 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D. Neb. 1982); F.E.L. Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Nat’l Conference 
of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
 36. A few cases base contributory liability on a defendant’s encouraging 
others to commit infringement. E.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Light-
house Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1292–95 (D. Utah 1999). However, 
the vast majority do not analyze contributory liability this way, preferring in-
stead to concentrate on the requirements of knowledge and material contribu-
tion. Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (“[T]he standard for contributory infringement has two prongs—the 
‘knowledge’ prong and the ‘material contribution’ prong.”), modified, 220 F. 
Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff ’d, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005); Intellectual 
Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 (stating that knowledge and participation are 
touchstones of contributory infringement); Ez-Tixz, 919 F. Supp. at 734 (“Con-
tributory liability requires a showing of (1) actual or constructive knowledge 
and (2) participation.”); Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 293 (“[B]enefit and con-
trol are the signposts of vicarious liability, [whereas] knowledge and participa-
tion [are] the touchstones of contributory infringement.”). 
 37. These facts are loosely based on Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. at 1453–55. 
See infra text accompanying notes 61–73 (summarizing Abdallah). 
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culpable because he knows exactly who commits the infringe-
ment, understands the nature of the infringement, and pro-
vides assistance that directly supports the infringement. By 
contrast, consider a defendant who processes credit card trans-
actions despite learning that certain unidentified customers 
take credit cards in payment for the sale of infringing goods.38 
This defendant is less culpable than the seller of blank tapes 
because his knowledge of identity is less specific and his sup-
port is less directly related to infringement. Accordingly, the 
scope of contributory copyright liability depends on whether li-
ability requires fairly specific knowledge and direct assistance, 
or whether general knowledge and indirect assistance will suf-
fice. Courts differ in their answers to this question, but a ma-
jority of courts require relatively specific knowledge and direct 
assistance.39 
This limited approach to contributory liability starts with 
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 
Inc.40 The Gershwin defendant was Columbia Artists Manage-
ment, a company that managed concert artists and created op-
portunities for them to perform.41 Columbia sometimes created 
performance opportunities by organizing local community per-
formance associations who would in turn sponsor annual con-
cert series for which Columbia could book its performers.42 Co-
lumbia provided regular assistance to these local associations.43 
It also contacted its artists to get the titles of the works being 
performed, and it printed programs for each performance.44 Un-
fortunately, many of these performances took place without ap-
propriate copyright licenses, and a number of copyright holders 
sued Columbia.45 The district court held Columbia liable on 
 
 38. These facts are loosely based on Perfect 10 Inc. v. Visa International 
Service Ass’n, No. C 04-00371 JW, 2004 WL 3217732 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2004). 
 39. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (holding that the defendant’s general knowledge 
that users of its Betamax videorecorders might commit infringement is not 
enough to support a claim of third-party copyright liability); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 59–60 (concluding that a defendant cannot generally be 
held liable merely because it knows that others will use items sold by the de-
fendant to commit copyright infringement). 
 40. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 41. Id. at 1160. 
 42. Id. at 1160–61. 
 43. Id. at 1161. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1160. 
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theories of contributory and vicarious liability, and the Second 
Circuit affirmed.46 
On the whole, Columbia was a rather culpable defendant. 
It knew the specific identities of the infringers, the works being 
infringed, and the dates on which infringement would hap-
pen.47 Moreover, Columbia supported this infringement by or-
ganizing the entities that sponsored infringing concerts and 
providing logistical assistance.48 Accordingly, Gershwin is con-
sistent with the proposition that liability exists only when the 
defendant has fairly specific knowledge of infringement and of-
fers direct assistance. 
The Supreme Court reinforced the limited interpretation of 
contributory liability in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.49 In that case, the plaintiffs held copyright in a 
number of works that were broadcast for television viewing and 
copied by individuals using videotape recorders (VCRs) made 
and sold by Sony.50 The claim against Sony was simple. Sony 
knew that some of the people who bought VCRs would use 
them to commit infringement, and yet Sony assisted them by 
selling VCRs.51 The Ninth Circuit agreed with this argument 
and held Sony liable.52 
 
 46. Id. at 1162–63. 
 47. The opinion is not perfectly clear regarding the basis for Columbia’s 
knowledge that infringing performances were taking place. Columbia stipu-
lated that it made no efforts to obtain licenses for the performances, but that 
does not necessarily mean that the artist or the local venue would not obtain 
one. Id. at 1161. However, it seems likely that Columbia knew the actual prac-
tices of its artists and venues. Indeed, the court stated that Columbia “knew 
that copyrighted works were being performed . . . and that neither the local 
association nor the performing artists would secure a copyright license.” Id. at 
1163. 
 48. Id. at 1160–61. 
 49. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 50. Id. at 419–20. 
 51. Id. at 422–24. 
 52. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 975–
76 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (“First, the knowledge element is 
clearly satisfied. The corporate appellees ‘know’ that the Betamax will be used 
to reproduce copyrighted materials. In fact, that is the most conspicuous use of 
the product. That use is intended, expected, encouraged, and the source of the 
product’s consumer appeal. The record establishes that appellees knew and 
expected that Betamax’s major use would be to record copyrighted programs 
off-the-air. Second, there is no doubt that appellees have met the other re-
quirements for contributory infringement—inducing, causing, or materially 
contributing to the infringing conduct of another. The corporate appellees are 
sufficiently engaged in the enterprise to be held accountable.”). 
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sony did not 
have the type of knowledge necessary to support infringe-
ment.53 In so doing, the Court worried that broad third-party 
copyright liability would harm the public interest by deterring 
productive, legitimate behavior.54 Copyright therefore had to 
“strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate de-
mand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in 
substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”55 The Court re-
jected the Ninth Circuit’s finding that Sony had actual knowl-
edge of infringement, stating that constructive knowledge of-
fered the only plausible method for supporting Sony’s 
liability.56 In theory, Sony’s knowledge about its customers’ use 
of VCRs might have established constructive knowledge, but 
the Court held that such knowledge could not exist as long as 
VCRs were “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”57 The 
Court concluded that VCRs were indeed capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses and decided the case in Sony’s favor.58 
The implications of Sony are significant. Sony clearly knew 
(“actually knew” in the colloquial sense) that some users of 
VCRs would commit infringement.59 Sony therefore supports 
the proposition that a defendant cannot be held liable merely 
because it knows that others will use something the defendant 
sells to commit copyright infringement. Something more is 
needed. The thing being sold must be incapable of substantial 
noninfringing use, or the defendant must have more specific 
knowledge about infringement, perhaps by knowing the precise 
identity of the infringer and the works being infringed.60 
 
 53. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (“If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony 
in this case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with construc-
tive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make 
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law 
of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.”). 
 54. Id. at 442. 
 55. Id.  
 56. See supra note 53 (quoting Sony). 
 57. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (“Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, 
like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory in-
fringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable pur-
poses. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”).  
 58. Id. at 456. 
 59. See supra note 52 (quoting the Ninth Circuit’s Sony opinion). 
 60. Other courts have endorsed this position. See Matthew Bender & Co. 
v. W. Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding the defendant not 
liable even though so-called “star pagination” in legal case reports might allow 
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For example, in A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, the defen-
dant Abdallah sold “time-loaded” cassette tapes.61 Such tapes 
are ordinary blank cassettes that have been loaded with an 
amount of tape designed to run for a particular time.62 Legiti-
mate producers of recorded music use them to reproduce music 
programming of nonstandard length.63 To illustrate, if twenty-
six minutes of programming are duplicated on a standard 
thirty-minute cassette, listeners would be inconvenienced by 
long periods of silence at the end of the tape.64 A cassette with 
precisely twenty-six minutes of tape is far more desirable.65 
Abdallah sold time-loaded cassettes to specific individuals, 
knowing they used the tapes to produce counterfeit recordings 
of popular music.66 In some cases, Abdallah timed the length of 
legitimate tapes slated for counterfeiting in order to determine 
the type of cassette needed.67 Abdallah claimed that Sony 
shielded him from contributory liability because blank time-
loaded cassette tapes are capable of substantial noninfringing 
use.68 Abdallah was correct in his characterization of such 
 
others to infringe plaintiffs’ copyrights); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 
847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding the defendant not liable for selling 
software that facilitated copying of computer programs on disks protected by 
anti-copying technology, despite the defendant’s knowledge that customers 
might commit copyright infringement); Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 
211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 474–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding the sponsor of a work 
containing infringing copies of photographs not contributorily liable because 
the sponsor made a reasonable inquiry about possible infringement and re-
ceived assurances from the primary infringer), modified, 220 F. Supp. 2d 237 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff ’d, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Canus 
Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that a letter 
complaining about infringement committed by unidentified exhibitors at com-
puter shows was insufficient to establish summary judgment for the plaintiff 
on the issue of the defendant’s knowledge); Livnat v. Lavi, No. 96 Civ. 4967 
(RWS), 1998 WL 43221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1998) (“[A]ssistance must bear 
a direct relationship to the infringing acts, and the contributory infringer must 
have acted in concert with the direct infringer.”); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 
690 F. Supp. 289, 290–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that a real estate broker 
was not contributorily liable for selling land on which a house had been built 
with the assistance of infringing architectural plans). 
 61. 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1456. 
 64. Id. at 1454. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 1454–55. 
 67. Id. at 1455. 
 68. Id. at 1456–57. 
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tapes, for legitimate producers of music frequently use them.69 
However, the court correctly rejected Abdallah’s use of Sony be-
cause he knew exactly to whom he was selling the tapes and 
the precise nature of the buyers’ behavior.70 Moreover, Abdal-
lah’s assistance went beyond the mere sale of blank tapes.71 He 
even financed his customers after a police raid.72 Therefore, 
Abdallah’s direct assistance, coupled with his specific knowl-
edge of his customers’ infringing activities, justified the district 
court’s imposition of contributory infringement.73 
2. The Limited Interpretation of Vicarious Copyright Liability 
Courts have also adopted limited interpretations of vicari-
ous liability. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co. pro-
vides the modern definition of the doctrine.74 In Shapiro, the 
Jalen Amusement Company had made counterfeit recordings of 
a number of songs in which the plaintiffs held copyright.75 
Jalen, the concessionaire who operated the record department 
in stores owned by the defendant H.L. Green Co., sold the coun-
terfeit recordings in Green’s stores.76 Green’s relationship with 
its concessionaire was fairly close.77 Jalen had operated Green’s 
record department for thirteen years,78 Jalen and its employees 
were obligated to follow Green’s rules and regulations, and 
Green had the authority to discharge Jalen’s employees.79 Daily 
receipts from the sale of records went into Green’s cash regis-
ters, and Green’s cashiers took custody of the money.80 Green 
then deducted its ten to twelve percent commission, the sala-
ries of Jalen’s employees, and taxes, before giving the balance 
to Jalen.81 Customers who purchased records from Jalen re-
ceived receipts from Green with no mention of Jalen.82 The 
 
 69. See id. at 1456. 
 70. Id. at 1456–58. 
 71. Id. at 1457. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 1456. See supra note 60 for examples of other cases that adopt 
the limited approach to contributory liability identified here. 
 74. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 75. Id. at 306. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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plaintiffs sued Green, contending that it was liable for Jalen’s 
infringement, but the district court found for Green.83 
The Second Circuit reversed.84 In so doing, the court un-
derstood that Jalen was not technically Green’s employee.85 
Nevertheless, the court believed that the policies supporting re-
spondeat superior would be well served by holding Green li-
able.86 The court wrote: 
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and 
direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials—
even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly 
is being impaired—the purposes of copyright law may be best effectu-
ated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploi-
tation.87 
In the case at hand, Green had considerable control over 
Jalen’s behavior through Green’s ability to dictate policy and 
employment, operate its stores, and control financial receipts.88 
Green’s percentage commission also gave it a direct financial 
interest in Jalen’s infringement.89 Accordingly, the court ap-
propriately held Green vicariously liable.90 
Shapiro implied that vicarious copyright liability requires 
a fairly high level of control over and an immediately direct fi-
nancial interest in another’s infringement. On the issue of con-
trol, Green had a great deal of power over Jalen, particularly 
with respect to the conduct of Jalen’s employees, their pay-
ment, and the handling of revenue raised from record sales.91 
Such power exceeded the simple ability to influence whether 
infringement occurred. It bordered on the active, day-to-day 
management of the underlying infringer’s business. Similarly, 
with respect to financial interest, Green took a percentage of 
every infringing record sale.92 Jalen’s infringement led directly 
to money in Green’s coffers. That is why the Second Circuit 
used Green’s “obvious and direct financial interest” in Jalen’s 
infringement to justify liability.93 The result presumably would 
 
 83. Id. at 305. 
 84. Id. at 307. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (citation omitted). 
 88. Id. at 306. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. at 308–10. 
 91. Id. at 306. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 307. 
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have been different if Green had had only an obscure and indi-
rect financial interest in Jalen’s behavior. 
Many courts have followed this interpretation of Shapiro. 
For example, in Banff Ltd. v Limited, Inc., the Southern Dis-
trict of New York considered the claim that the defendant Lim-
ited, Inc. was liable for infringement committed by its corporate 
subsidiary.94 The court recognized that it could have inter-
preted Shapiro’s language to impose liability on the defendant 
because a corporate parent legally controls its subsidiaries and 
benefits from the subsidiaries’ profits.95 However, the court 
feared that this interpretation would hold every parent liable 
for the infringing acts of its subsidiaries.96 Such a result would 
improperly expand copyright’s reach, so the court interpreted 
Shapiro narrowly. The court stated that the formal relationship 
between two parties did not control the existence of vicarious 
liability.97 Liability could exist only if the parties’ paths 
“cross[ed] on a daily basis, and the character of this intersec-
tion must be such that the party against whom liability is 
sought is in a position to control the personnel and activities 
responsible for the direct infringement.”98 
Similarly, in Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publishing (USA), 
Inc., the defendant organized a trade show at which it rented 
booths to various exhibitors.99 The plaintiffs alleged that some 
of those exhibitors performed some of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted 
music without licenses.100 The plaintiffs sued, claiming that 
Reed was vicariously liable for the infringing performances.101 
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the court de-
cided in favor of Reed.102 The court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ 
arguments clearly expressed a limited vision of vicarious liabil-
ity. The defendant unquestionably had some ability to control 
whether infringement occurred, because it could have prohib-
ited the use of music by exhibitors or monitored such use. The 
plaintiffs contended that this ability established a right and 
 
 94. 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 95. Id. at 1107. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1109. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Nos. 93 CIV. 3428(JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 
17, 1994). 
 100. Id. at *2. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at *3, 6–7. 
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ability to supervise,103 but the court rejected this argument, cit-
ing Shapiro.104  
The plaintiffs also argued that the defendant had a finan-
cial interest in the underlying infringements because music 
made the exhibits more attractive, thereby increasing the 
show’s paid attendance and the defendant’s revenue.105 The 
court rejected this interest as insufficient,106 a conclusion that 
made sense given the obvious distinction between the direct 
generation of cash receipts through infringement in Shapiro 
and the secondary, indirect economic effects identified by the 
Artists Music plaintiffs.107 
B. THE EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRIBUTORY AND 
VICARIOUS COPYRIGHT LIABILITY 
The limited interpretation of third-party copyright liability 
was a well-established part of pre-Grokster law, for it was con-
sistent with the seminal cases in the field and endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in Sony. However, a few courts interpreted the 
law differently. Their opinions expanded third-party copyright 
liability, making it significantly easier to hold defendants liable 
for the misconduct of others. 
 
 103. Id. at *4. 
 104. Id. at *5–6. 
 105. Id. at *6. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Other courts take a similar view. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 
1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no vicarious liability against the Internet 
service provider America Online (AOL) for allowing its subscribers access to 
infringing copies of the plaintiff ’s work posted by a third party who was not an 
AOL subscriber); Goes Lithography Co. v. Banta Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 
1045 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (finding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action 
for vicarious copyright liability against a parent corporation for infringement 
committed by its wholly owned subsidiary); Burdick v. Koerner, 988 F. Supp. 
1206, 1210 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (“[T]he better-reasoned case law demonstrates 
that in order to establish vicarious liability in the context of a claim for copy-
right infringement, a plaintiff must introduce evidence beyond a defendant’s 
membership on a board of directors.”); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire 
Equip. Distribs. & Nw. Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(finding no vicarious liability against an Internet service provider for its sub-
scriber’s infringing posting of photographs); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom 
On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (find-
ing no vicarious liability against an Internet service provider for infringing 
postings of texts by a third party to an online bulletin board service). It should 
be noted that the author served as an expert witness at the district court level 
in Ellison on behalf of AOL with respect to issues related to the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act. Those issues are not directly related to this Article. 
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Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.108 is the leading case 
that adopts an expansive interpretation of third-party copy-
right liability. The defendants operated the Cherry Auction 
swap meet, which rented booth space to vendors for a daily 
fee.109 Cherry Auction knew that a number of these vendors 
sold counterfeit music tapes.110 The Fresno County Sheriff 
raided Cherry Auction’s swap meet in 1991, seizing over thirty-
eight thousand counterfeit recordings and making twenty-
seven arrests.111 In 1992, the Sheriff sent a letter to Cherry 
Auction stating that vendors continued to sell counterfeit re-
cordings and that Cherry Auction had agreed to provide the 
Sheriff with identifying information about the infringers.112 
The plaintiff ’s own investigator also observed infringement at 
the swap meet by over fifty percent of the vendors.113 Despite 
such knowledge, Cherry Auction continued to operate the swap 
meet and rent space to infringers, and it never gathered the in-
formation it had agreed to provide the Sheriff.114 In fact, the de-
fendants apparently had created two categories of spaces for 
rent, reserving one for those who preferred not to provide iden-
tification.115 This behavior allowed the majority of infringers to 
rent in relative anonymity.116 The plaintiffs sued on theories of 
contributory and vicarious liability.117 
The case against the Fonovisa defendants was question-
able under the limited interpretation of third-party copyright 
liability. With respect to contributory liability, the Fonovisa de-
fendants knew less about and did less to help infringement 
than the Shapiro or Abdallah defendants did. Those operating 
the Cherry Auction only knew that infringement took place at 
the swap meet, but they did not know the precise identities of 
the miscreants or the works infringed.118 Renting booths to in-
 
 108. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 109. Id. at 261. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (noting observation of widespread infringement); see also Fonovisa, 
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (noting 
observation of infringement by “ten of fifteen” and “twelve of seventeen” ven-
dors), rev’d, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 114. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261. 
 115. Fonovisa, 847 F. Supp. at 1494. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. The district court opinion and the Ninth Circuit opinion recount that 
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fringers facilitated the sale of infringing goods, but the Fono-
visa defendants did not organize infringing entities or print 
programs for infringing performances, nor did the Fonovisa de-
fendants measure the time of music being copied or finance in-
fringers.119 With respect to vicarious liability, Cherry Auction 
did not control its vendors the way Green controlled Jalen in 
Shapiro, nor did Cherry Auction derive revenue from each in-
fringing sale.120 The district court recognized this and dis-
missed the plaintiff ’s complaint, citing Gershwin and Shapiro 
as support.121 The plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit re-
versed.122 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of third-party copyright 
liability clearly differed from the limited interpretation that 
this Article has already described. The court held that Fonovisa 
had alleged sufficient knowledge to support contributory liabil-
ity even though the defendants lacked the specific knowledge 
found in Gershwin and Abdallah.123 Additionally, the court 
weakened contributory liability’s requirement of material con-
tribution by endorsing the idea that simply providing the 
means to infringe creates contributory liability.124 
Fonovisa did even more to expand vicarious liability. In 
Shapiro, the defendant Green had the ability to fire Jalen’s 
employees, collected Jalen’s cash receipts, paid Jalen’s taxes, 
and issued paychecks on Jalen’s behalf.125 The Fonovisa defen-
dants could do none of these things. Nevertheless, the court 
 
the defendants were aware of infringing sales, but neither opinion states that 
the defendants knew the precise identities of the infringers or the works in-
fringed. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261; Fonovisa, 847 F. Supp. at 1494. 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 40–48, 61–73 (describing Gershwin 
and Abdallah). 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 77–81 (describing the defendant’s 
relationship with the infringer in Shapiro). 
 121. Fonovisa, 847 F. Supp. at 1495–97 (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. 
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); Demetriades v. 
Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
 122. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 259. 
 123. Id. at 264; see also Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162–63 (2d Cir. 1971) (describing the extent of Colum-
bia’s knowledge); A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1454–55 
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (describing Abdallah’s specific knowledge); supra text accom-
panying notes 40–48, 61–73 (describing Gershwin and Abdallah). 
 124. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
 125. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d 
Cir. 1963); supra text accompanying notes 77–81 (discussing the infringer /  
third party relationship in Shapiro). 
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found that the defendants had sufficient control because they 
could terminate vendors who committed infringement.126 With 
respect to financial benefit, the Ninth Circuit was equally gen-
erous. Under Shapiro, vicarious liability could not exist unless 
the defendant had a direct financial interest in the underlying 
infringement.127 Green had a direct financial interest because it 
took a percentage of each infringing sale by Jalen.128 By con-
trast, the Fonovisa defendants had a much less direct interest 
in infringement because they did not share the revenues of in-
fringers who rented swap meet booths.129 This distinction did 
not impress the Fonovisa court, for it considered an indirect fi-
nancial benefit alone sufficient to support vicarious liability.130 
This interpretation of the law directly contradicted the re-
quirement of direct financial interest found in Shapiro and 
many other cases, and it was crucial to the court’s decision in 
the plaintiffs’ favor.131 
Fonovisa is not the only case to apply third-party copyright 
liability expansively.132 Indeed, this approach has become suffi-
 
 126. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262–63. 
 127. Id. at 263. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Fonovisa’s departure from Shapiro was no accident, for the Ninth Cir-
cuit explicitly drew support from Polygram International Publishing, Inc. v. 
Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994), a case in which the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts explicitly adopted the notion that an indirect financial 
interest could support vicarious liability. Id. at 1326. It is worth pointing out 
that this Article is not taking the position that the result of Fonovisa was 
wrong. The Fonovisa defendants supported and profited from infringers in a 
culpably cynical way that made their liability appropriate. This Article simply 
observes that the doctrinal interpretation used to reach this result leads to 
broader third-party copyright liability than the interpretation associated with 
Sony and the other cases discussed earlier. As will be discussed later, this ex-
pansive interpretation of the law exposes innocent actors to undue threats of 
liability that threaten the public interest. See infra text accompanying notes 
191–202 (discussing expansive interpretations of third-party copyright liabil-
ity). This Article further asserts that the Supreme Court addressed this prob-
lem through its adoption in Grokster of a fault-based theory of third-party 
copyright liability and the endorsement of intentional inducement as a form of 
such liability. See infra Part IV. 
 132. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (determining that the defendant’s ability to block users from access-
ing its system combined with the role of music in attracting users to its system 
establishes likelihood of vicarious liability); Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, 
Inc., No. 03-2670 (JBS), 2006 WL 842883, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) (grant-
ing summary judgment against flea-market operators for infringement com-
mitted by vendors); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 
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ciently common to suggest that a remote business relationship 
with an infringer is enough to create third-party liability.133 For 
example, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., the 
plaintiff Perfect 10 held copyrights in a number of pornographic 
images distributed via its magazine and website.134 To Perfect 
10’s dismay, some competitor websites displayed infringing cop-
ies of Perfect 10 images.135 Perfect 10 could presumably have 
sued each of these websites for copyright infringement, but it 
chose instead to sue Cybernet Ventures, a company which ran 
an age verification service (AVS) called Adult Check.136 
Adult Check’s primary function was to verify the ages of 
viewers who wished to see the pornographic images on a num-
ber of independent websites that voluntarily chose to use the 
Adult Check service.137 A new viewer who visited an affiliated 
website received the opportunity to purchase a password to a 
number of affiliated websites through Cybernet. Cybernet 
charged the viewer a fee via credit card and verified the 
viewer’s age, using the credit card as a proxy for age.138 Cyber-
net also offered different tiers of password membership, with 
viewers who paid higher fees gaining access to “higher-quality” 
websites.139 Cybernet reviewed the various websites in its net-
work for the quality of its images, monitored compliance with 
its policies, and shared the fees it collected with affiliated web-
sites that referred customers.140 Perfect 10 moved for a pre-
liminary injunction, that among other things, would have re-
quired Cybernet to enforce Perfect 10’s copyright interests 
against affiliated websites.141 
 
412–14 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss a suit al-
leging that the venture capital firm that took control of a company operating a 
file-sharing network is liable for vicarious and contributory infringement); 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 994 (E.D. Cal. 2004) 
(granting summary judgment against flea market operators for infringement 
committed by vendors). 
 133. See Motorvations Inc. v. M&M Inc., No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617 
(D. Utah July 6, 2001) (finding defendant automobile dealerships vicariously 
liable for infringement of copyrighted advertising because of the defendants’ 
ability to reject the advertising). 
 134. 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1156–57 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 135. Id. at 1162. 
 136. Id. at 1158. 
 137. Id. at 1157–58. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1158. 
 140. Id. at 1158–59, 1173. 
 141. Id. at 1191–95 (outlining the terms of the preliminary injunction 
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The limited approach to third-party copyright liability 
casts doubt on Perfect 10’s suit against Cybernet. Granted, Cy-
bernet arguably marketed a number of websites and worked to 
create a uniform appearance and brand, but those activities do 
not necessarily establish the elements of a third-party copy-
right claim. With respect to contributory liability, Cybernet’s 
knowledge seemed too general, because many of the complaints 
it received were “generic.”142 Additionally, it is hard to see how 
processing membership payments and password systems con-
tributed directly to infringement. These payments may have 
provided economic support to infringing websites, but that does 
not rise to the level of arranging infringing performances for 
one’s own clients or providing blank tapes for use by known 
counterfeiters. For vicarious liability, it seems difficult to con-
clude that Cybernet could control the underlying infringement, 
as each individual website was responsible for its own content 
and servers.143 Moreover, Cybernet’s revenue did not come di-
rectly from infringement in the same way that Green’s revenue 
came from Jalen’s. Considering these facts under the usual 
standard that preliminary injunctions are issued only when the 
plaintiff shows a strong likelihood of success on the merits,144 
Perfect 10’s chances for success would seem slim. 
Nevertheless, the Perfect 10 court granted the desired pre-
liminary injunction, relying heavily on Fonovisa to create an 
interpretation of third-party copyright liability that comforta-
bly supported its decision. The court began by adopting Fono-
visa’s expansive view of contributory liability, concluding that 
 
granted on the plaintiff ’s behalf). 
 142. Id. at 1169. 
 143. Id. at 1158 (“Individual ‘webmasters’ run the websites that make up 
the Adult Check ‘network.’ . . . Each webmaster is responsible for running the 
website, including creating the site’s content, finding a server to host the site 
and other technical details . . . .”). 
 144. Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining 
that “a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits” is 
among the prerequisites for issuance of a preliminary injunction); see also 
Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 601 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (explaining that “the probability that the moving party will succeed 
on the merits” is a factor considered for a preliminary injunction); Miss. Power 
& Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(quoting Callaway, 489 F.2d at 572); 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed. 1995), quoted in Mazurek v. 
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (“[A] preliminary injunction is an ex-
traordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the 
movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
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Cybernet’s general level of knowledge was comparable to 
Cherry Auction’s.145 Next, the court cited Fonovisa for the 
proposition that general support for an infringer’s business, as 
opposed to direct support of infringement, satisfies the re-
quirement of material contribution.146 The court made similar 
use of Fonovisa to support its findings about vicarious liability. 
Remember that Fonovisa found a relatively indirect financial 
interest in infringement sufficient to support vicarious liabil-
ity.147 Cybernet therefore could not escape liability simply be-
cause it did not take a share of any profits raised from in-
fringement.148 To the contrary, Cybernet had the necessary 
financial interest because the availability of infringing images 
attracted people to websites where they were encouraged to 
purchase age verification services.149 Finally, the court cited 
Fonovisa in concluding that Cybernet’s ability to terminate in-
fringers from its membership program and control customer ac-
cess through passwords established the control necessary to 
support vicarious liability.150 
Motorvations Inc. v. M&M Inc. offers yet another example 
of the expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liabil-
ity.151 The plaintiff Motorvations specialized in designing ad-
vertisements for car dealerships.152 James Whipple, who was 
also in the advertising business, copied Motorvations’ prior 
work in order to promote a car-sale event for Motorvations’ for-
mer client, Larry H. Miller Chrysler/Plymouth (Miller).153 Mo-
torvations sued Whipple for copyright infringement and Miller 
for vicarious and contributory infringement.154 In addition, Mo-
torvations sued Karl Malone Toyota (Malone), who joined the 
event that Whipple was promoting, but did not deal directly 
 
 145. 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1169–70 (“This evidence of notice compares favora-
bly with the allegations of notice in [Fonovisa].”). 
 146. Id. at 1170–71. 
 147. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 
1996); supra text accompanying notes 127–31 (discussing Fonovisa’s broad in-
terpretation of financial benefit). 
 148. 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 (expressing strong disagreement with Cyber-
net’s contention that it lacked a sufficient financial interest for vicarious liabil-
ity). 
 149. Id. at 1170–71. 
 150. Id. at 1171–72. 
 151. No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617 (D. Utah July 6, 2001).  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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with Whipple.155 The court rejected the contributory copyright 
claims at summary judgment, but held that Miller and Malone 
were vicariously liable.156  
The Motorvations approach to vicarious liability is expan-
sive, especially when one keeps in mind the facts of cases like 
Shapiro. Neither defendant supervised Whipple to the extent 
that Green supervised Jalen, nor did Miller or Malone receive 
revenue directly from the infringement.157 Indeed, Malone had 
no direct dealings with Whipple.158 Nevertheless, the court held 
Miller and Malone liable at summary judgment.159 The court 
understood that Miller and Malone had relatively distant rela-
tions with Whipple, but it feared the consequences of failing to 
hold them liable. Miller and Malone might be innocent, but 
other defendants would take advantage of the law’s leniency by 
turning a “blind eye” to infringement.160 The court therefore 
preferred to hold Miller and Malone liable to ensure liability 
against all irresponsible parties. The court accomplished this 
objective by holding that Miller and Malone’s mere ability to re-
ject the advertising established sufficient control, and that the 
defendants had a direct financial interest in creation of 
Whipple’s advertisement.161 
A simple hypothetical demonstrates how cases like Fono-
visa, Perfect 10, and Motorvations greatly expand the scope of 
third-party copyright liability.162 Imagine an aggressive copy-
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. (“In a business relationship of this sort, it would be all too easy for 
a principal to turn a blind eye to tortious and infringing conduct, and neglect 
what would otherwise be its duty to prevent the same, with the expectation 
that the agent will bear sole responsibility. Furthermore, the relationship’s 
particular ability to avoid determinative evidence establishing the parties’ re-
spective roles facilitates a principal’s ability to, after-the-fact, deny its ability 
to supervise, especially when it can be held liable if the same is established.”). 
 161. The Motorvations court said practically nothing about its conclusion 
that sufficient financial interest existed, but it must have thought that the re-
lationship between the advertisement and the financial success of the car-sale 
event was enough to establish a “direct financial interest.” See id. 
 162. Several authors have analyzed the expansive nature of Fonovisa. See 
Matt Jackson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: An Historical Analysis of 
Copyright Liability, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 397 (2002); Barbara 
Kolsun & Jonathan Bayer, Indirect Infringement and Counterfeiting: Remedies 
Available Against Those Who Knowingly Rent to Counterfeiters, 16 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 383, 407–09 (1998); Kenneth A. Walton, Is a Website Like a 
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right holder who wants to hold the electric company responsible 
for copyright infringement. His argument is simple. A lot less 
infringement would occur if the electric company would stop 
selling electricity to infringers because infringers need electric-
ity to access the Internet, burn CDs, or use their computers. To 
this end, he discovers the names and addresses of various in-
fringers and sends a complaining letter to the electric company. 
He claims that if the electric company does not turn off the 
power to the identified infringers, he will sue. 
This hypothesized claim is deliberately farfetched. The Su-
preme Court’s Sony decision would surely rule out contributory 
liability based on constructive knowledge derived from aware-
ness that people use electricity to commit infringement because 
electricity is capable of substantial noninfringing uses such as 
running refrigerators and illuminating light bulbs.163 To the ex-
tent that the argument for contributory liability might rest on 
actual knowledge of specific individuals committing infringe-
ment, the electric company would still not be liable because it is 
not substantially involved in infringement.164 Finally, vicarious 
liability would not exist because the electric company does not 
dictate who commits infringement, and its financial interest is 
remote.165 
However, the expansive interpretation endorsed by Fono-
visa makes the opposite result plausible. The electric company 
can control whether infringement occurs by turning off the 
power. Additionally, the electric company has at least an indi-
rect interest in the underlying infringement because infringing 
behavior increases the demand for electricity. Given Fonovisa’s 
view that the ability to exclude someone from a swap meet and 
the ancillary effect of infringement on concession sales is 
 
Flea Market Stall? How Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction Increases the Risk of 
Third-Party Copyright Infringement Liability for Online Service Providers, 19 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 921, 942–44 (1997); Yen, Peer-to-Peer, supra 
note 25, at 829; Sverker K. Högberg, Note, The Search for Intent-Based Doc-
trines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 930–
31 (2006). 
 163. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984) (rejecting liability for a provider of technology as long as the technology 
is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses”). 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 66–73 (discussing Abdallah’s di-
rect assistance to infringers and his specific knowledge of infringers’ activi-
ties). 
 165. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing limited interpretations of vicarious 
liability). 
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enough to establish vicarious liability,166 the electric company’s 
vicarious liability is no longer farfetched. Fonovisa similarly af-
fects the analysis of the electric company’s contributory liabil-
ity.167 Knowledge arguably exists because our hypothetical 
plaintiff sent letters identifying infringers to the electric com-
pany.168 Moreover, infringers could never commit the infringe-
ment without electricity. Hence the electric company offers the 
same kind of support, if not stronger support, to infringers as 
did Cherry Auction.169 
 
 166. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262–64 (9th 
Cir. 1996); supra text accompanying notes 125–31 (describing how Fonovisa 
expanded vicarious liability). 
 167. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264; supra text accompanying notes 123–24 
(describing how Fonovisa expanded contributory liability). 
 168. In fact, the percentage of electric-company customers who commit in-
fringement is probably quite high because electronic equipment that gets used 
for infringement has become ubiquitous. For example, every use of a photo-
copying machine raises the possibility of infringement because copyright re-
serves to authors the right to reproduce copyrighted works, and practically 
every office and many homes contain photocopying machines. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106 (2000) (listing exclusive rights reserved to copyright owners); id. § 107 
(codifying doctrine of fair use, which limits the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders under various circumstances); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Docu-
ment Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that a copyshop 
committed infringement by making photocopies on behalf of professors for use 
as course readings at a university); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 
F.3d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming that the defendant Texaco committed 
infringement when its employees made photocopies of journal articles for later 
use in scientific research). Videotape recorders are equally common, and are 
often used to make and keep copies of television programming on a long-term 
basis. Although the Supreme Court has held that making of short-term copies 
for purposes of time shifting is fair use, the making of copies for long-term pur-
poses could easily be considered infringement. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454–55 
(affirming the lower court’s conclusion that time shifting is fair use). Addition-
ally, the development of digital video recorders like TiVo have compounded the 
likelihood of infringement by making recording easier and permitting the 
sharing of recordings between devices. See TiVoToGo, http://www.tivo.com/ 
4.9.4.1.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (describing the TiVoToGo service). Fi-
nally, the common ownership of personal computers connected to the Internet 
makes the commission of infringement, however inadvertent, quite likely. See 
supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text (showing many opportunities for 
Internet users to commit infringement). 
 169. Granted, the Fonovisa court may not have wanted to hold the electric 
company liable for infringement committed by others. However, the point be-
ing made here is not that the court intended such a result but rather that the 
interpretation embraced by the court contained no obvious limit to stop such a 
result from occurring. This sets the stage for the expansion of third-party 
copyright liability. 
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II.  TRADEOFFS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF  
THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY   
Fonovisa and its progeny meant that the pre-Grokster law 
of third-party copyright liability contained two divergent lines 
of cases. The first line applied liability relatively narrowly, lim-
iting liability to defendants who are closely involved with in-
fringement committed by others. The second line took a much 
broader approach, expanding liability to defendants whose 
goods or services support infringement indirectly or occasion-
ally. The inconsistency of pre-Grokster law raises the question 
of why courts would interpret the same doctrines so differently. 
Answering this question is not easy, and it requires exploration 
of the theory and practical consequences of third-party copy-
right liability. This exploration shows that courts have adopted 
different interpretations of third-party copyright liability be-
cause they disagree about tradeoffs implicit in constructing the 
law. 
Courts agree that third-party copyright liability is a de-
scendant of common law tort,170 and tort law offers two theories 
that motivate third-party copyright liability. Such liability 
could exist because a defendant’s faulty behavior caused some-
one else to infringe. Alternatively, it could exist because, at 
least in some situations, defendants are strictly liable for in-
fringement committed by others. 
Fault and strict liability explain third-party copyright li-
ability in different ways. Courts use fault to identify defendants 
who deserve to be held liable. Fault generally means that the 
defendant intended to injure the victim or failed to take rea-
sonable precautions against the possibility of the victim’s in-
jury.171 Faulty defendants deserve to be held liable because 
 
 170. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (supporting the proposition 
that third-party copyright liability arose from common law tort). 
 171. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 2–3 (describing two general categories of 
fault: intentional wrongs and negligent wrongs); see also Conway v. O’Brien, 
111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (“[A person’s negligence depends on] the like-
lihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the 
injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice 
to avoid the risk.”), rev’d, 312 U.S. 492 (1941); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (stat-
ing that a person acts negligently if the person fails to exercise “reasonable 
care”); id. § 5 (imposing liability for intentional causation of physical harm); 
id. § 6 (imposing liability for negligent causation of physical harm); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (imposing liability for intentional causa-
tion of harmful or offensive physical contact); id. §§ 283, 284 (describing negli-
gence as a form of unreasonable behavior). 
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they have done something wrong and are culpably responsible 
for the victim’s injury.172 This explanation implies that third-
party copyright liability exists to hold defendants responsible 
for the consequences of unreasonably supporting infringement. 
By contrast, courts impose strict liability in tort with relatively 
little regard for whether defendants have behaved unreasona-
bly. Instead, the objective is to make defendants prevent inju-
ries and raise compensation for tort victims.173 This approach 
suggests that third-party copyright liability exists to deter in-
fringement and ensure compensation for any infringement that 
occurs. 
Strict liability and fault identify important social benefits 
associated with third-party copyright liability. It is good for so-
ciety to discourage infringement, raise compensation, and hold 
unreasonable actors liable for the consequences of their behav-
ior. However, it is important to recognize the undesirable side 
effects that accompany pursuit of these worthy goals. 
Consider the potential third-party copyright liability of 
Internet service providers (ISPs). ISPs support infringement, 
but they also support a great deal of legitimate, noninfringing 
behavior such as email, web surfing, and shopping. If society 
adopted a blanket rule that ISPs must always pay for in-
fringement committed by their subscribers, ISPs would respond 
by stopping some infringement and paying for the rest. Society 
would benefit because copyrights would be more secure, but at 
least two potentially undesirable consequences would follow. 
First, such broad liability would certainly fall on ISPs that 
do not deserve liability because their behavior is reasonable. As 
an extreme example, an ISP might comprehensively monitor its 
subscribers and suspend all who are suspected of infringement. 
Such an ISP would stop a great deal of infringement, but 
sooner or later a mistake would be made and infringement 
would occur. It is unfair to hold such an ISP liable because the 
precautions it took against infringement seem more than rea-
sonable. The culpability that might otherwise justify liability 
simply does not exist. 
 
 172. See DOBBS, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]orts are traditionally associated 
with wrongdoing in some moral sense.”); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and 
Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277, 294–95 (1994) (explaining that 
liability in tort exists only when a defendant has done something wrong, par-
ticularly the intentional or negligent acts that constitute faulty behavior). 
 173. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for 
strict liability). 
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Second, such broad liability would create social losses by 
suppressing valuable noninfringing behavior. Some ISPs may 
respond to blanket liability by going out of business, thereby 
causing the loss of all the noninfringing behavior the ISP previ-
ously supported. If an ISP chose to stay in business, it would 
sometimes mistakenly identify a subscriber’s behavior as in-
fringing and deny service to a noninfringer. Even if the ISP 
simply chose to pay for its subscribers’ infringement, it would 
likely do so by levying a fee on all of its subscribers, including 
those who do not commit infringement. These noninfringing 
subscribers would have to pay more for Internet service, and 
subscribers at the margin would ultimately forego the use of 
the Internet and its benefits. 
This analysis shows that courts must balance the advan-
tages and disadvantages of third-party copyright liability. 
Striking this balance requires as much art as science. As an 
initial matter, some of the relevant costs and benefits seem in-
commensurable. It may be possible to put a dollar value on 
copyright security, but the injustice of imposing liability on a 
defendant who has behaved reasonably defies simple monetiza-
tion. Moreover, some of the considerations that are theoreti-
cally quantifiable will prove elusive to measure. There may be a 
theoretical dollar value for the noninfringing behavior that is 
suppressed as third-party copyright liability expands. However, 
the ways in which those losses occur are so diverse that an ac-
curate measurement seems unlikely and certainly beyond the 
means of courts. Courts must therefore make sensitive, almost 
philosophical, judgments about the social importance of deter-
ring infringement, compensating victims, and holding the cul-
pable liable, and they must do likewise for the social costs of 
exposing reasonable, innocent defendants to liability and sup-
pressing legitimate, noninfringing behavior. Only then can they 
decide whether the pursuit of admirable objectives justifies the 
collateral losses that inevitably follow. 
Judges disagree about the interpretation and scope of 
third-party copyright liability because they have different opin-
ions on the theory and practical implementation of the law. The 
relevant pattern of disagreement emerges by recognizing that 
vicarious copyright liability is a form of strict liability, while 
contributory liability is a form of fault-based liability that re-
sembles negligence. Vicarious copyright liability is strict be-
cause courts impose it without regard to the reasonableness of 
the defendant’s behavior. Such liability exists when the defen-
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dant has “the right and ability to supervise” an infringer and 
“an obvious and direct financial interest” in the infringe-
ment.174 If vicarious copyright liability were based on fault, 
then defendants would be able to escape liability by taking rea-
sonable precautions that excuse them from liability for any in-
fringement that happens to occur.175 However, the elements of 
vicarious liability obviate that possibility because precautions 
taken by the defendant do not affect the defendant’s control 
over or financial interest in any underlying infringement. In 
short, vicarious liability exists as long as a defendant has the 
necessary relationship with an infringer.176 
Contributory liability is a form of fault-based liability be-
cause it mimics tort law’s inquiry into a defendant’s potential 
negligence. Standard tort law imposes on defendants the duty 
to behave as a reasonable person in the same or similar cir-
cumstances.177 When courts evaluate whether a defendant is 
negligent, they determine what the defendant knew or rea-
sonably should have known about the consequences associated 
with his behavior and whether the defendant acted reasonably 
 
 174. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 
1963). 
 175. See Russ v. State, 191 So. 296, 298 (Fla. 1939) (“Negligence is the fail-
ure to observe for the protection of another’s interest such care, precaution 
and vigilance as the circumstances justly demand . . . .”); Weinberg v. Dinger, 
524 A.2d 366, 374 (N.J. 1987) (“To act non-negligently is to take reasonable 
precautions to prevent the occurrence of foreseeable harm to others.”); Hart v. 
Ivey, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177–78 (N.C. 1992) (“Actionable negligence is the failure 
to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable and prudent person would 
exercise under similar conditions.”). 
 176. The point being made here can perhaps be seen more easily by consid-
ering the vicarious tort liability of an employer under respondeat superior. For 
example, a package delivery service would be held vicariously liable if a deliv-
ery truck operated by a full-time, salaried employee during regular working 
hours runs a red light and strikes a pedestrian. Liability exists no matter how 
many precautions the delivery service has taken because liability is strict. 
Precautions taken by the delivery service do not affect the existence of liabil-
ity. They can only affect the likelihood of an accident. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM ch. 4, scope note, at 276–77 (“A 
highly important rule of strict liability is respondeat superior, which renders 
employers liable for harms caused by the negligence (and sometimes the in-
tentional torts) of their employees, acting within the scope of employment.”). 
 177. Sanders v. Scarvey, 224 So. 2d 247, 250 (Ala. 1969) (“Negligence 
means the failure to exercise reasonable or ordinary care, such care as a rea-
sonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar cir-
cumstances.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 
HARM § 3 (stating that a person acts negligently if the person fails to exercise 
“reasonable care”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283, 284 (1965) (de-
scribing negligence as a form of unreasonable behavior). 
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in light of those consequences.178 Contributory liability depends 
on the defendant’s knowledge of and material contribution to 
the infringement of another.179 These elements amount to ask-
ing what a defendant knew or reasonably should have known 
about another’s infringement and whether the defendant be-
haved reasonably in light of that knowledge.180 Liability is a 
matter of fault because defendants can escape liability by refus-
ing to provide material contribution to known infringers—a 
form of behaving reasonably in light of what they know. 
The foregoing shows that vicarious and contributory liabil-
ity affect third-party copyright liability very differently. Con-
tributory liability’s reliance on fault implies that contributory 
liability meaningfully limits the scope of third-party copyright 
liability. In tort, fault imposes liability only on culpable defen-
dants who deserve to be held liable because they have inten-
tionally or negligently injured others. Accordingly, the mere 
fact that a defendant could have taken precautions against a 
plaintiff ’s injury does not, in and of itself, justify liability. 
Something more is required, namely a finding that the defen-
dant’s behavior was unreasonable with respect to the plain-
tiff.181 Fault significantly limits third-party copyright liability 
because many individuals who might limit or stop infringing 
behavior are not unreasonable for having failed to do so. For 
example, landlords certainly support infringement because 
some of their renters will commit infringement, and landlords 
 
 178. Knapp v. Stanford, 392 So. 2d 196, 199 (Miss. 1980) (“The test [for 
negligence] is whether the actor being charged with negligence in any circum-
stance acted as a reasonable and prudent person would have acted under the 
same or similar circumstances.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284(a) 
(“Negligent conduct may be . . . an act which the actor as a reasonable man 
should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of 
an interest of another . . . .”). 
 179. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); supra text accompanying notes 35–36 (discussing 
the definition of contributory liability). 
 180. The connection between contributory copyright liability and negli-
gence is explored further in Yen, Peer-to-Peer, supra note 25, at 855–59. 
 181. See Rogers v. Retrum, 825 P.2d 20, 23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (finding 
that simple exposure to risk is not enough to establish a defendant’s negli-
gence); Lane v. City of Buffalo, 250 N.Y.S. 579, 584 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931) 
(“The test of actionable negligence is not what could have been done to have 
prevented a particular accident, but what a reasonably prudent and careful 
person would have done under the circumstances in the discharge of his duty 
to the injured party. Failure to guard against a remote possibility of accident, 
or one which could not, in the exercise of ordinary care, be foreseen, does not 
constitute negligence.”). 
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could take precautions to reduce infringement. However, sim-
ply renting property is not unreasonable behavior. Accordingly, 
a court applying fault principles would not ordinarily hold land-
lords liable for infringement committed by tenants.182 
By contrast, vicarious liability expands third-party copy-
right liability because vicarious liability is strict. As noted ear-
lier, courts impose strict liability in tort because it deters tor-
tious conduct and raises compensation for victims.183 Strict 
liability broadens third-party copyright liability because its ra-
tionale applies to almost any defendant who has influence over 
infringement by others. After all, such a defendant could use 
her influence to stop or reduce infringement, so liability will 
force her to do so or raise money to pay for it. Accordingly, a 
court applying strict liability might hold almost any defendant 
liable in order to encourage precaution against infringement 
and ensure the payment of compensation to copyright hold-
ers.184 
The relationship between the theories and doctrines of 
third-party copyright liability makes it possible to identify how 
judicial attitudes towards the advantages and disadvantages of 
such liability emerge in the theoretical and doctrinal choices 
that this Article has described. On one hand, some courts think 
that the advantages of third-party copyright liability are mod-
est, especially when compared to the risks of exposing innocent 
defendants to liability and suppressing noninfringing behavior. 
These courts prefer fault-inspired constructions of the law be-
cause fault is sensitive to the problems associated with third-
party copyright liability. Accordingly, they limit the application 
of vicarious liability to a relatively narrow range of facts and 
interpret contributory liability with considerable regard for the 
defendant’s possible innocence and the legitimate noninfringing 
activities the defendant supports. Two cases discussed earlier, 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios185 and Banff 
Ltd. v. Limited, Inc.,186 illustrate this perfectly. In Sony, the 
Supreme Court refused to entertain seriously the possibility of 
 
 182. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306–08 
(2d Cir. 1963); Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938). 
 183. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for 
strict liability). 
 184. See Priest, supra note 27, at 527 (noting that the “unavoidable impli-
cation” of enterprise liability is “absolute liability”). 
 185. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 186. 869 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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vicarious liability,187 and it went on to find in Sony’s favor pre-
cisely because it worried that the losses associated with third-
party copyright liability outweighed any gains.188 In Banff, 
Judge Haight understood the “serious implications in greatly 
expanding the reach of the Copyright Act,”189 and refused to 
hold a parent corporation vicariously liable for the infringe-
ment of its subsidiary.190 
On the other hand, some courts have great confidence in 
the benefits of third-party copyright liability and worry very lit-
tle about the associated losses. These courts are comfortable 
with the consequences of strict liability, and they gravitate to-
ward the expansive application of vicarious and contributory 
liability with relatively little concern for the consequences that 
may follow. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.191 vividly ex-
emplifies this reasoning. Remember that the Fonovisa defen-
dants had a good case under a limited interpretation of third-
party copyright liability, and the district court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ complaint on that basis.192 The Ninth Circuit’s rever-
sal therefore required expansive interpretations of both vicari-
ous and contributory liability.193 A telling combination of theory 
and factual circumstance made this possible. 
With respect to vicarious liability, the court adopted a clear 
strict liability rationale that embraced third-party liability as 
valuable without considering the potential negative conse-
quences.194 The court approvingly cited Polygram International 
Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., a case in which the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts considered a suit for vicarious copyright 
liability against the operator of a trade show for the unlicensed 
use of music by some of the show’s exhibitors.195 These facts 
 
 187. Sony’s treatment of vicarious liability is a bit puzzling. The Court uses 
the term “vicarious liability.” Sony, 464 U.S. at 439. However, the analysis 
surrounding use of that term is clearly borrowed from contributory liability 
because it concentrates on Sony’s knowledge, and knowledge is not an element 
of vicarious liability. This blending of vicarious liability into contributory li-
ability suggests the Court’s sensitivity to the undesirable side effects of strict 
liability and the Court’s preference to limit the scope of vicarious liability. 
 188. Id. at 441–42. 
 189. 869 F. Supp. at 1107. 
 190. Id. at 1107–11. 
 191. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 192. Id. at 262, 264. 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 108–31 (describing how Fonovisa 
expanded third-party copyright liability). 
 194. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262–64. 
 195. 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1317–18 (D. Mass. 1994), cited in Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 
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were similar to those of Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publishing 
(USA), Inc.,196 a case discussed earlier as an example of limited 
vicarious liability. The reader will recall that the Artists Music 
court did not believe that a trade show operator had enough 
control over or financial interest in an exhibitor’s infringement 
to justify liability.197 The Polygram court reached exactly the 
opposite conclusion, adopting a strict liability theory of the 
case: 
Modern decisions, when explaining policy justifications for vicarious 
liability rather than merely citing precedent, commonly refer to risk 
allocation. When an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in 
which identifiable types of losses are expected to occur, it is ordinarily 
fair and reasonable to place responsibility for those losses on the per-
son who profits, even if that person makes arrangements for others to 
perform the acts that foreseeably cause the losses. The law of vicari-
ous liability treats the expected losses as simply another cost of doing 
business. The enterprise and the person profiting from it are better 
able than either the innocent injured plaintiff or the person whose act 
caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift them to others who 
have profited from the enterprise. In addition, placing responsibility 
for the loss on the enterprise has the added benefit of creating a 
greater incentive for the enterprise to police its operations carefully to 
avoid unnecessary losses.198 
This led the court to the consciously broad interpretation of vi-
carious liability that the Fonovisa court later adopted. 
With respect to contributory liability, the Fonovisa court 
concentrated on facts that made the defendants seem culpably 
responsible for assisting infringement. Among other things, the 
defendants knew that a number of their renters committed in-
fringement because of the raid conducted by the sheriff and the 
complaints received from the plaintiff.199 They promised to help 
the sheriff identify infringers, but never followed through.200 In 
fact, they appear to have facilitated hiding the infringers’ iden-
tity by creating a class of booths that could be rented anony-
 
at 262. 
 196. Nos. 93 CIV. 3428(JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 17, 1994). 
 197. Interestingly, the Artists Music court used fault to explain its reason-
ing: “The purpose of imposing vicarious liability is to punish one who unfairly 
reaps the benefits of another’s infringing behavior.” Id. at *4. This statement 
implies that the Artists Music court was uncomfortable about the prospect of 
holding a defendant liable unless the defendant had done something truly 
blameworthy. 
 198. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325. 
 199. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261. 
 200. Id. 
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mously.201 These facts show that the defendants were not inno-
cent, accidental supporters of infringement. To the contrary, 
they cynically calculated that infringement was good for their 
business and took deliberate steps for the purpose of perpetuat-
ing infringement. The defendants wanted infringement to oc-
cur, and they wanted to capitalize on it for business purposes. 
In short, leaving aside questions of law, the defendants were 
culpable and deserved to be held liable. 
The Ninth Circuit must have been outraged by the idea 
that such cynically culpable defendants could escape liability 
for operating a business that profited so openly from infringe-
ment. The injustice of the district court’s decision probably con-
vinced the Ninth Circuit that a great deal of good would come 
from holding the defendants liable—enough good to overcome 
any undesirable consequences associated with an expansion of 
third-party copyright liability’s scope. Accordingly, the court 
expanded the scope of contributory copyright liability to make 
sure that culpable actors would be held responsible for in-
fringement they supported, but it simultaneously opened the 
door to overbroad liability that threatens innocent actors while 
imposing more social costs than benefits.202 
In short, courts failed to give the pre-Grokster law of third-
party copyright liability a coherent structure for two reasons. 
First, they could not agree about the advantages and disadvan-
tages of such liability. Second, they had not resolved whether 
 
 201. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (E.D. 
Cal. 1994), rev’d, 76 F.3d 259. 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 162–69 (analyzing the effects of an 
expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liability). The same thinking 
existed in Motorvations Inc. v. M&M Inc., No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617 
(D. Utah July 6, 2001). The court wrote: 
In a business relationship of this sort, it would be all too easy for a 
principal to turn a blind eye to tortious and infringing conduct, and 
neglect what would otherwise be its duty to prevent the same, with 
the expectation that the agent will bear sole responsibility. Further-
more, the relationship’s particular ability to avoid determinative evi-
dence establishing the parties’ respective roles facilitates a principal’s 
ability to, after-the-fact, deny its ability to supervise, especially when 
it can be held liable if the same is established. 
Id. This language shows a court concerned more about stopping infringement 
than protecting an innocent defendant from liability. The court knew that it 
was interpreting the law to prevent cynical actors from disclaiming responsi-
bility, and the court decided that it was important to stop these cynical actors, 
even if the occasional “wrong” result had to be tolerated. See Grossman, supra 
note 9, at 359 (arguing that expansion of third-party copyright liability to “get 
at the bad guys” created doctrine that can no longer limit the scope of third-
party copyright liability). 
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such liability is primarily a matter of fault or strict liability. 
Improvement in the law therefore required a framework that 
clearly delineates the relative roles of fault and strict liability, 
while taking a stance on the relative importance of the advan-
tages and disadvantages associated with third-party copyright 
liability. This background explains why Grokster became an 
important case. Many anticipated that the Supreme Court 
would use Grokster to clarify the law by definitively choosing 
one interpretation that clearly identified the parameters of 
third-party copyright liability. As will be discussed below, the 
Court did not do this as directly as some might have hoped. It 
did, however, discuss third-party copyright liability in a man-
ner that promotes a more coherent and effective structure for 
the law. 
III.  GROKSTER   
Grokster was the third of three closely followed cases about 
the liability of peer-to-peer technology providers.203 In all three 
cases, the plaintiffs held copyright in various works that were 
traded over peer-to-peer networks created by the defendants, 
and the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were vicariously 
and contributorily liable for making infringement over those 
networks possible. Decisions in the first two of these cases fa-
vored the plaintiffs,204 but the Ninth Circuit granted summary 
judgment to the Grokster defendants.205 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed.206 
The Supreme Court could have decided Grokster for either 
party because each side had support from one branch of pre-
Grokster law. For example, the Court could have applied liabil-
ity expansively under Fonovisa and its progeny. Vicarious li-
ability would have existed because the Grokster defendants had 
 
 203. The other cases were In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 
(7th Cir. 2003), and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
 204. See In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 656 (rejecting the defendant’s appeal 
and affirming the district court decision in favor of the plaintiffs); Napster, 239 
F.3d at 1024 (agreeing with the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs 
had demonstrated a likelihood of success on their third-party copyright liabil-
ity claim). 
 205. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 
1163–67 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
 206. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 
2782–83 (2005). 
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at least some control over their users’ infringement207 and 
made peer-to-peer technology available to infringers in the 
hope of eventually turning a profit through advertising reve-
nue.208 Contributory liability would have been found because 
the defendants created their networks despite knowing that 
many people would use the networks for infringement.209 
The Court could just as easily have used Sony to deny li-
ability under a limited interpretation of third-party copyright 
liability. The Sony Corporation knew that many individuals 
committed infringement with VCRs and still sold the technol-
ogy that made infringement possible.210 However, the Supreme 
Court refused to hold Sony liable.211 As an initial matter, the 
generalized knowledge that some individuals used VCRs to 
commit infringement did not establish Sony’s actual knowledge 
of infringement. Sony’s liability therefore depended on the im-
putation of constructive knowledge to Sony.212 However, the 
Court held the imputation of such knowledge inappropriate be-
cause VCRs were capable of “substantial noninfringing uses.”213 
Application of this logic would have excused the Grokster de-
fendants from liability. After all, the defendants’ networks sup-
ported more than infringing behavior. The district court found 
that users traded public domain files as well as copyrighted 
files with the permission of copyright holders. Such activity 
comprised a distinct minority of network activity, but it was 
sufficient for the district court and the Ninth Circuit to charac-
terize the noninfringing uses as “substantial.”214 The Supreme 
 
 207. For example, the defendants could have refused to distribute the soft-
ware or designed safeguards into their networks. 
 208. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 209. Id. at 2772. 
 210. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423–
24 (1984) (mentioning surveys taken by Sony that showed some users accumu-
lating libraries of tapes recorded from off-air broadcasting). 
 211. Id. at 421. 
 212. Id. at 439 (“If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, 
it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with constructive knowl-
edge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make unauthor-
ized copies of copyrighted material.”). 
 213. Id. at 442 (“[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other arti-
cles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product 
is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely 
be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”); id. at 456 (concluding that the 
Betamax videotape recorder was capable of substantial noninfringing uses). 
 214. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 
1161–62 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035–37 (C.D. Cal. 2003),  
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Court therefore had the chance to establish Sony’s control over 
cases like Grokster, or to limit Sony’s application in favor of 
reasoning like Fonovisa’s. 
Grokster was a tricky case for the Supreme Court because 
it embodied the problematic tradeoffs that already plagued the 
law. Application of Sony would have had the laudable effect of 
protecting innocent defendants from liability and avoiding any 
chill on noninfringing behavior. However, it also would have 
jeopardized the cases of copyright holders against cynical and 
unethical defendants who wanted to exploit Sony’s pro-
defendant standard. Almost every technology that supports 
copyright infringement can also be used for noninfringing pur-
poses. Unethical and cynical individuals would then claim that 
they could support and profit from infringement by citing our 
hypothesized Grokster decision for the proposition that a very 
small percentage of legitimate use was enough to shield a tech-
nology provider from third-party copyright liability, no matter 
what. 
The most obvious “solution” to this problem would have 
been an interpretation of Sony that allowed courts to more eas-
ily hold defendants liable. Such an intellectual maneuver would 
have been similar to the one made by the Fonovisa court, and 
the Court could have accomplished it either by holding the de-
fendants vicariously liable or by adopting the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment for contributory liability against distributors of technol-
ogy “principally” used for infringement.215 Such an 
interpretation of Sony would indeed have stopped the unethical 
and cynical from evading liability. Unfortunately, it would also 
have exposed many innocent technology providers to liability 
simply because others use their technology to infringe, and it 
could easily have discouraged people from creating valuable 
technology, thereby harming the public interest.216 
The Court chose not to follow either branch of pre-Grokster 
law, opting instead to endorse a new, third branch of third-
 
aff ’d, 380 F.3d 1154, vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764. 
 215. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 
2778 (2005) (noting the plaintiffs’ argument that Sony did not apply to prod-
ucts used principally for infringement). 
 216. See id. at 2775 (recognizing the possibility of discouraging innovation 
through third-party copyright liability); Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–
16, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480), available at http://www 
.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-480.pdf (re-
cording various Justices expressing concern about discouraging innovation if 
the plaintiffs’ position was adopted). 
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party copyright liability. This left Sony’s sensitivity about the 
negative consequences of such liability intact while creating a 
new cause of action to protect copyrights. The Court began with 
a perceptive and nuanced understanding of contributory liabil-
ity. Before Grokster, the overwhelming majority of cases ana-
lyzed such liability under a single rubric that depended on the 
elements of knowledge and material contribution.217 Justice 
Souter correctly recognized that these elements worked by 
measuring the culpable fault of a defendant.218 Justice Souter’s 
explicit reference to fault made it possible to explain the logic of 
Sony in a way that would protect innocent technology providers 
from suit while imposing liability on unethical and cynical dis-
tributors of technology. 
The Court began by reviewing Sony’s logic and its relation-
ship to patent law’s staple article of commerce doctrine. The 
Court wrote: 
In sum, where an article is “good for nothing else” but infringement, 
there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, 
and there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to in-
fringe. Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of sell-
ing an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and lim-
its liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere 
understanding that some of one’s products will be misused.219 
This passage demonstrates the Court’s concern for separat-
ing innocent technology providers whose users happen to com-
mit infringement from those whose behavior is so culpable that 
liability is justified. Moreover, the Court clearly did not con-
sider a defendant sufficiently culpable simply for knowing that 
its technology could be used to infringe. A “more acute fault” 
was required.220 This requirement made the plaintiffs’ sug-
gested interpretation of Sony unsatisfactory because it would 
impose liability on too many innocent defendants. 
It was equally clear, however, that the Court was not going 
to allow Sony to shield all distributors of technology simply be-
 
 217. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); supra text accompanying notes 35–36 (discussing 
the definition of contributory liability). 
 218. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777–78 (noting that Sony could not be 
“faulted” simply for selling VCRs and that liability is reserved for cases of 
“more acute fault” than the simple understanding that a defendant’s products 
would be misused); id. at 2779 (stating that the Sony rule limited culpable in-
tent). 
 219. Id. at 2777–78 (citations omitted) (quoting Canada v. Mich. Malleable 
Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903)). 
 220. Id. at 2778. 
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cause people might use the technology legally. The Court un-
derstood that the culpability of a technology provider depends 
on the provider’s intent as well as the technology’s characteris-
tics. It is one thing to distribute technology that could be used 
to infringe in the hope that others will use it legitimately. It is 
something else to distribute the same technology in the hope 
that others will use it to infringe. The court wrote: 
Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from 
the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But nothing in 
Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evi-
dence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based 
liability derived from the common law. Thus, where evidence goes be-
yond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put 
to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to pro-
moting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude li-
ability.221 
The Grokster Court’s use of fault created two different 
ways of analyzing the third-party copyright liability of technol-
ogy providers. The first approach identifies fault from the char-
acteristics and uses of technology distributed by the defendant, 
and it is limited by Sony. A defendant who distributes technol-
ogy presumably knows what its technology does and how it 
might be used. If the technology is used for infringing purposes, 
the defendant’s knowledge of such use provides a plausible ba-
sis for labeling the defendant’s behavior faulty. However, Sony 
limits the imposition of such liability to cases where the defen-
dant’s technology is not capable of substantial noninfringing 
use because a more permissive regime of liability would expose 
too many innocent defendants to liability.222 
The second approach identifies fault from evidence of the 
defendant’s deliberate inducement of infringement and is not 
limited by Sony.223 Someone who advertises use of a particular 
technology for infringement or instructs users on how to com-
mit infringement is culpable if infringement results. Moreover, 
that culpability does not depend on the characteristics of the 
technology in question. The defendant would be equally culpa-
ble if the technology in question has many or very few nonin-
 
 221. Id. at 2779 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 222. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439–
42 (1984).  
 223. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (“Thus, where evidence goes beyond a 
product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing 
uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, 
Sony’s staple article rule will not preclude liability.”). 
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fringing uses because the defendant’s culpability arises from 
his specific desire to cause infringement. Accordingly, Sony 
does not affect the third-party copyright liability of defendants 
who intentionally induce infringement.224 
The identification of two distinct analyses for third-party 
copyright liability profoundly affected the outcome of Grokster. 
If liability could be derived only from characteristics of the de-
fendants’ technology, the defendants would presumably have 
escaped liability because the district court found that the de-
fendants’ technology was capable of substantial noninfringing 
use. However, the possibility of liability based on the defen-
dants’ intentional inducement opened the door to holding the 
defendants liable despite those noninfringing uses. The Court 
drew particular attention to evidence suggesting that the Grok-
ster defendants wanted their users to infringe. Among other 
things, the defendants tried to attract users of other peer-to-
peer file-sharing programs that were widely used to infringe,225 
encouraged users to infringe,226 and planned to capitalize on in-
fringement they knew would occur.227 The Court went on to 
find that the Ninth Circuit had failed to consider evidence of 
the defendants’ intent to cause infringement, vacated, and re-
manded for further consideration.228 
 
 224. Id. at 2779 (“Evidence of ‘active steps . . . taken to encourage direct 
infringement,’ such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to en-
gage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the product be used 
to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged overcomes the 
law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial 
product suitable for some lawful use.” (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith 
Elecs. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988))). 
 225. Id. at 2772 (referring to the defendants’ attempt to recruit those who 
used the file-sharing program Napster). 
 226. Id. (“[E]ach [defendant] clearly voiced the objective that recipients use 
[the technology] to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to 
encourage infringement.”). 
 227. Id. at 2774. (“[The defendants’] principal object was [to] use . . . their 
software to download copyrighted works.”); id. at 2780–82 (describing purpose-
ful behavior of the defendants). 
 228. Id. at 2778–79, 2783. The district court recently granted a motion 
against defendant StreamCast Networks on the theory suggested by the Su-
preme Court. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. 
CV0108541SVWPJWX, 2006 WL 2806882, at *14–23, 29 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 
2006) (order granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on liability 
against defendant StreamCast Networks, Inc.). The other Grokster defendants 
apparently settled. Id. at *1. 
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IV.  THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT 
LIABILITY AFTER GROKSTER   
It may seem on first inspection that Grokster has done 
nothing to improve the construction of third-party copyright li-
ability and may have confused things even more. The case left 
behind three distinct causes of action for third-party copyright 
liability. If courts could not agree about the proper interpreta-
tion of the two doctrines that existed before Grokster, they 
should have even more trouble agreeing about vicarious liabil-
ity, contributory liability, and inducement. This reaction to 
Grokster is wrong. In reality, Grokster laid the groundwork for 
constructive change in the law by emphasizing fault, and not 
strict liability, as the primary theory of third-party copyright 
liability. This emphasis on fault discredited the expansive ap-
plication of third-party copyright liability found in Fonovisa 
and its progeny. It further implied that the limited application 
of contributory liability and inducement should become the 
backbone of the law, with a smaller role reserved for vicarious 
liability. 
A. THE PRIMACY OF FAULT AS A THEORY OF THIRD-PARTY 
COPYRIGHT LIABILITY 
Grokster sent a strong signal that the Supreme Court con-
siders fault the primary theory of third-party copyright liabil-
ity. Note that the Court could have easily reversed the Ninth 
Circuit by adopting a strict liability theory of the case. Such a 
decision would have been consistent with the imposition of vi-
carious liability, and it would have sent a strong message that 
security of copyright mattered more to the Court than a defen-
dant’s innocence or the suppression of noninfringing behavior. 
Of course, the Court chose not to do this, preferring instead to 
explain its decision with a new cause of action based on fault.229 
This implied that the Justices were uncomfortable with strict 
liability and preferred a fault theory of the case because fault 
offered a better framework for balancing the advantages and 
disadvantages of third-party copyright liability. 
The initial conceptualization of Grokster illustrates the 
Court’s commitment to fault. The Court recognized that third-
party copyright liability has its costs, and that balancing is cru-
 
 229. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779–80; supra text accompanying notes 
218–24 (analyzing Grokster ’s references to fault). 
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cial to proper construction of the law.230 The Court knew that 
the case for liability against the defendants was strong, yet it 
eschewed strict liability in favor of fault. In fact, the Court’s 
commitment to fault was so strong that it changed the ration-
ale of vicarious liability from strict liability to fault. Justice 
Souter wrote: “One infringes contributorily by intentionally in-
ducing or encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vi-
cariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining 
to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”231 At first inspection, this 
sentence looks like a routine statement of the basic elements 
for third-party copyright liability. The language feels like boi-
lerplate, and the Court cites to the seminal cases defining those 
elements, Gershwin and Shapiro.232 However, closer examina-
tion reveals that something more significant is going on. The 
reference to Gershwin was generally accurate, and it obviously 
foreshadowed the Court’s later adoption of inducement.233 
However, the reference to Shapiro introduced an important 
change. Shapiro stated that: 
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and 
direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials—
even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly 
is being impaired—the purposes of copyright law may be best effectu-
ated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploi-
tation.234 
This is a clear statement of strict liability. A defendant with the 
appropriate relationship to an infringer is liable for any in-
fringement that occurs, no matter what. The defendant can ex-
ercise all the control that she has over the infringer in an effort 
to stop infringement, but this will not excuse her liability. By 
contrast, Grokster ’s statement of vicarious liability allows the 
defendant to escape liability by exercising control. The Court 
 
 230. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775 (“The more artistic protection is favored, 
the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of 
copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off.”). 
 231. Id. at 2776 (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. 
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)). 
 232. Id. 
 233. The Gershwin court stated: “[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infring-
ing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct 
of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.” Gershwin Publ’g 
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(footnote omitted). 
 234. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 
1963) (citation omitted). 
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stated that a defendant “infringes vicariously by profiting from 
direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or 
limit it.”235 No longer does a defendant face liability even if she 
exercises control. To the contrary, she escapes liability if she 
exercises whatever control she has, even if she fails to stop the 
infringement. This means that a defendant is not at fault if she 
takes reasonable precaution against the possibility of harm to 
the plaintiff, a result that is theoretically consistent with the 
Court’s later assertion that those who induce infringement de-
serve to be held liable.236 
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAULT 
Grokster ’s reliance on fault points the way to an improved, 
more coherent construction of third-party copyright liability. 
Remember that judicial disagreement about fault and strict li-
ability contributed a great deal to the inconsistencies of pre-
Grokster law. Grokster settled this disagreement by clearly 
turning away from the strict liability rationale that supported 
Polygram International Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc.237 
and Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.238 This preference for 
fault created a framework that will govern the future interpre-
tation of vicarious liability, contributory liability, and induce-
ment in copyright. 
First, and most importantly, courts should limit vicarious 
liability to a relatively narrow range of facts. Expansive appli-
cation of such liability of the sort found in Fonovisa and Mo-
torvations Inc. v. M&M Inc.239 would make perfect sense if 
strict liability were the primary rationale governing third-party 
copyright liability. However, Grokster made strict liability a 
secondary justification for such liability. Future courts should 
therefore restrict the application of vicarious copyright liability, 
 
 235. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 (emphasis added). 
 236. It is, of course, possible that the Court was simply lax in its formula-
tion of vicarious liability and that no push toward fault was implied. There are 
two reasons to discount this possibility. First, the language used is an unmis-
takable change from Shapiro, and its reference to fault matches the important 
role played by fault in the rest of the opinion. Second, Justice Souter is a de-
liberate legal writer, a “lawyer’s lawyer” who would not inadvertently depart 
from a clear, well-known formulation of doctrine. 
 237.  855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994). 
 238.  76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 239.  No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617 (D. Utah July 6, 2001). 
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perhaps to the general contours of respondeat superior, in order 
to avoid contradicting Grokster ’s reliance on fault.240 
 
 240. As a normative matter, employers probably should be held strictly li-
able for infringement committed by their employees within the scope of em-
ployment. Respondeat superior offers a sensible model for vicarious copyright 
liability because it preserves results that are well accepted as a matter of tort 
law while providing sufficiently distinct yet flexible limits on the reach of li-
ability. In general, respondeat superior imposes liability on an employer for 
torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957). However, the relationship between em-
ployer and employee is defined in fairly general terms under the law of 
agency: 
Numerous factual indicia are relevant to whether an agent is an em-
ployee. These include: the extent of control that the agent and the 
principal have agreed the principal may exercise over details of the 
work; whether the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation or busi-
ness; whether the type of work done by the agent is customarily done 
under a principal’s direction or without supervision; the skill required 
in the agent’s occupation; whether the agent or the principal supplies 
the tools and other instrumentalities required for the work and the 
place in which to perform it; the length of time during which the 
agent is engaged by a principal; whether the agent is paid by the job 
or by the time worked; whether the agent’s work is part of the princi-
pal’s regular business; whether the principal and the agent believe 
that they are creating an employment relationship; and whether the 
principal is or is not in business. Also relevant is the extent of control 
that the principal has exercised in practice over the details of the 
agent’s work. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2004); 
see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) 
(listing various factors relevant to determination of whether an em-
ployer/employee relationship exists under the laws of agency in a copyright 
case involving the work-made-for-hire doctrine); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 220 (setting forth a list of factors relevant to the existence of an em-
ployer/employee relationship within agency law). The result of this generality 
is flexibility that permits courts to extend third-party liability to a reasonably 
narrow range of cases beyond the strict confines of a formal, salaried em-
ployer/employee relationship. This flexibility supports the decision reached in 
Shapiro, because the defendant store owner Green exercised a great deal of 
control over the behavior of its concessionaire Jalen for many years—control 
reasonably similar to that exercised by an employer over a formal, salaried 
employee. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 
(2d Cir. 1963); supra text accompanying notes 79–91 (describing the control 
exercised by Green). Still, this flexibility would not support the result reached 
in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 
2002), or Motorvations, because the defendants in those cases had considera-
bly less control than Green did over Jalen. See supra text accompanying notes 
137–40, 143, 150–61 (describing the control exercised by the defendants in 
Perfect 10 and Motorvations). For additional discussion of the normative desir-
ability of limiting vicarious liability to the approximate contours of respondeat 
superior, see Högberg, supra note 162, at 939–40. 
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Second, courts should cautiously apply contributory liabil-
ity to make sure that the doctrine does not turn into a form of 
strict liability. As was noted earlier, courts sometimes interpret 
the elements of knowledge and material contribution quite ex-
pansively. This is precisely what happened in Fonovisa and its 
progeny. The result may not technically be strict liability, but 
the effect is quite similar because innocent defendants face a 
real risk of liability.241 If concern about the negative conse-
quences of third-party copyright liability casts doubt on the ex-
pansive interpretation of vicarious liability, it should do like-
wise for the expansive interpretation of contributory liability. 
Courts should therefore eschew interpretations drawn from 
cases like Fonovisa in favor of those drawn from Sony precisely 
because Sony takes careful account of a defendant’s potential 
innocence and the unintended negative social consequences of 
third-party copyright liability. 
Third and finally, courts must vigilantly limit the scope of 
inducement to keep that doctrine from destroying the rationale 
behind fault-based third-party copyright liability. Such vigi-
lance is necessary because plaintiffs will surely urge courts to 
apply inducement broadly. After all, Sony does not apply to in-
ducement actions, so courts can hold defendants liable as in-
ducers without explicitly considering the undesirable side ef-
fects of third-party copyright liability. It therefore makes sense 
for plaintiffs to sue under inducement whenever possible be-
cause doing so would reach many defendants who would not be 
liable under Sony. 
The case for expansively applying inducement starts with 
the observation that defendants often know that their behavior 
will make significant infringement possible. If those defendants 
persist in such behavior, even for reasons unrelated to in-
fringement, they should be held liable because they effectively 
want the infringement to happen and therefore are culpable. If 
accepted, this interpretation of inducement might impose liabil-
ity on manufacturers of CD burners because manufacturers 
know that people often use those products to make infringing 
copies of music. The same conclusion might also apply to al-
most anyone whose behavior regularly supports infringement 
by others.242 
 
 241. See supra text accompanying notes 162–69, 191–202 (demonstrating 
how Fonovisa expanded third-party copyright liability). 
 242. This Article is not alone in predicting that litigants will advance 
claims like this. See Jane C. Ginsburg & Sam Ricketson, Inducers and Author-
YEN_5FMT 11/22/2006 10:59:41 AM 
232 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:184 
 
Careful reflection shows that this interpretation of in-
ducement is superficially attractive, but flawed. As an initial 
matter, Justice Souter’s opinion carefully circumscribes in-
ducement’s reach: 
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses 
would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor 
would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering 
customers technical support or product updates, support liability in 
themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on pur-
poseful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to 
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a 
lawful promise.243 
Additionally, a broad cause of action for inducement may 
sound in fault, but it is inconsistent with the fault-based 
framework created by Grokster. Once again, the common law of 
tort provides the crucial insight, for inducement and the law of 
intentional tort both require intentional behavior by the defen-
dant. In tort, courts define intent in two ways. A defendant ac-
cused of battery has intent if he acts with the express purpose 
of causing harmful or offensive contact on the plaintiff ’s 
body.244 Alternatively, intent exists if the defendant merely 
“knows with substantial certainty” that his conduct will cause 
such harmful or offensive contact.245 This dual definition of in-
tent shows that the suggested broad application of inducement 
is simply the attempt to apply the second, alternate formula-
tion of intent from tort. The claim is that third-party copyright 
 
isers: A Comparison of the US Supreme Court’s Grokster Decision and the Aus-
tralian Federal Court’s KaZaa Ruling, 11 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 1, 7 (2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888928 (predicting that inducement will 
displace Sony-type inquiries involving substantial noninfringing uses). 
 243. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 
2780 (2005). 
 244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13(a) (1965) (“An actor is subject 
to liability to another for battery if . . . he acts intending to cause a harmful or 
offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person . . . .”). 
 245.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“A person acts with the intent to produce a 
consequence if . . . the person acts knowing that the consequence is substan-
tially certain to result.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (“The word 
‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the 
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the con-
sequences are substantially certain to result from it.”). See generally David J. 
Jung & David I. Levine, Whence Knowledge Intent? Whither Knowledge In-
tent?, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 551 (1987) (reviewing intent as defined by the 
first Restatement of Torts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Kenneth W. 
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 471 (1992) (discussing 
intent and its role in tort law). 
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defendants intentionally induce infringement if they know with 
substantial certainty that their behavior will lead to infringe-
ment. After all, a person who knows that his behavior will 
surely cause harmful or offensive contact to another “wants” 
that contact to happen if he doesn’t change his behavior to stop 
it. Knowing with substantial certainty therefore makes a de-
fendant culpable in a way that is comparable to a defendant 
who acts with the express purpose of causing harmful or offen-
sive contact. Accordingly, third-party copyright defendants are 
as culpable as those who truly want infringement to occur sim-
ply because they know that their technologies or services lead 
to infringement. 
The broad interpretation of inducement fails because it 
rests on an insufficiently nuanced understanding of tort law. 
The typical “knowing with substantial certainty” case involves 
a defendant who has certainty about a single act that exposes 
the plaintiff to a single instance of potential harm. In the clas-
sic case of Garratt v. Dailey, the defendant was a boy who 
pulled a chair out from under a plaintiff who was in the process 
of sitting down.246 The plaintiff, who fell to the ground and suf-
fered injury, sued for battery.247 The trial court accepted the de-
fendant’s protestation that he did not want the plaintiff to get 
injured and found for the defendant.248 However, the Supreme 
Court of Washington reversed on the ground that the trial 
court failed to consider whether the defendant knew with sub-
stantial certainty that the plaintiff would fall to the ground be-
cause the defendant had pulled the chair away.249 
By contrast, tort law does not extend liability on the basis 
of substantial certainty to defendants whose substantial cer-
tainty comes from the repetitive creation of risk associated with 
the widespread manufacture and distribution of products. Con-
sider the sale of automobiles, guns, alcohol, and cigarettes. 
Those who make and sell these things know with substantial 
certainty that some of their products will eventually injure 
someone, yet they are not held liable for those injuries as bat-
 
 246. 279 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Wash. 1955). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. at 1093, 1095; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A 
illus. 1 (“A throws a bomb into B’s office for the purpose of killing B. A knows 
that C, B’s stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to injure C, but 
knows that his act is substantially certain to do so. C is injured by the explo-
sion. A is subject to liability to C for an intentional tort.”). 
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terers. Liability, if any, exists under doctrines like negligence 
and products liability.250 
The reasons for this are instructive. People have legitimate 
reasons for making and selling items like cars, guns, alcohol, 
and cigarettes. If battery were to control tort responsibility for 
the injuries these products cause, liability would turn on a 
blunt determination of whether the defendants knew that peo-
ple would be injured. Manufacturers of widely distributed 
products always know that injuries are inevitable, so liability 
would seem certain. However, such a result would be absurd 
and unfair because the legitimate reasons for making these 
items sometimes make the associated risk of injury reasonable. 
Doctrines like negligence and products liability consider the 
reasonableness of a defendant’s behavior in sophisticated ways 
that battery does not.251 It is therefore a mistake to determine 
the liability of manufacturers on the basis of substantial cer-
tainty because doing so would supplant the sophisticated bal-
ancing analyses of negligence or products liability.252 Courts 
 
 250.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 
cmt. e (“The applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to 
situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty 
that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone 
within a small class of potential victims within a localized area.”). Other au-
thors have also discussed these issues. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron 
D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating 
Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1138–43 (2001) (noting the need to limit intent 
based on substantial certainty); Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Reck-
lessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)’s Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1165, 1172–73 (2001).  
 251. Both negligence and products liability weigh the social value of the 
defendant’s behavior against any associated risks. Defendants become liable if 
these risks are unreasonable when compared against any social value. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998) (“A product . . . is 
defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product 
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not 
reasonably safe.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (“[An] act is negli-
gent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as 
the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (analyzing numer-
ous cases involving design-defect and the risk-benefit tests and suggesting 
that the design-defect test in products liability cases is similar to the negli-
gence analysis of reasonableness). 
 252. See Craig M. Lawson, The Puzzle of Intended Harm in the Tort of Bat-
tery, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 355, 362–65 (2001) (noting that broad readings of intent 
would improperly swallow huge areas of negligence or strict products liability 
law). 
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understand this, and that is why they reject intentional tort li-
ability in such cases. 
For example, in Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., the plaintiff sued a cigarette manufacturer for injuries 
the plaintiff contended arose from exposure to second-hand 
smoke.253 The plaintiff ’s complaint included claims for negli-
gence and battery.254 The defendant responded by moving to 
dismiss all of the plaintiff ’s claims.255 The court granted the de-
fendant’s motion on battery, but it allowed the plaintiff ’s claim 
for negligent failure to warn to proceed.256 
With respect to battery, the plaintiff argued that the 
manufacturer knew with substantial certainty that second 
hand smoke would eventually contact an unwilling person, 
causing injury.257 The logic of this claim is similar to the argu-
ment that a manufacturer of technology induces infringement 
because it knows that someone will eventually use the technol-
ogy for infringement. The Shaw court recognized this logic, and 
rejected it: 
Brown & Williamson did not know with a substantial degree of cer-
tainty that second-hand smoke would touch any particular non-
smoker. While it may have had knowledge that second-hand smoke 
would reach some non-smokers, the Court finds that such generalized 
knowledge is insufficient to satisfy the intent requirement for battery. 
Indeed, as defendant points out, a finding that Brown & Williamson 
has committed a battery by manufacturing cigarettes would be tan-
tamount to holding manufacturers of handguns liable in battery for 
exposing third parties to gunfire. Such a finding would expose the 
courts to a flood of farfetched and nebulous litigation concerning the 
tort of battery. It is unsurprising that neither plaintiffs nor the Court 
have been able to unearth any case where a manufacturer of ciga-
rettes or handguns was found to have committed a battery against 
those allegedly injured by its products.258 
 
 253. 973 F. Supp. 539, 541–42 (D. Md. 1997). 
 254. Id.  
 255. Id. at 542. 
 256. Id. at 552. 
 257. Id. at 548 (“Plaintiffs argue that the intent requirement is satisfied by 
Brown & Williamson’s intentional manufacture, marketing, and distribution 
of Raleigh cigarettes, on the basis that such acts ‘set[ ] in motion the inevitable 
series of events leading to plaintiff Robert Shaw’s injuries.’” (alteration in 
original)). 
 258. Id. It is worth noting that courts in workers’ compensation cases 
sometimes appear to expand the understanding of intent along the lines sug-
gested by the Shaw plaintiff. The facts of these cases typically involve an em-
ployer whose negligent behavior leads to an employee’s injury. The employee 
sues the employer, but the employer moves to dismiss on the ground that 
workers’ compensation provides the exclusive remedy for the employee’s in-
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The foregoing shows why it is important to limit the reach 
of inducement. If Grokster ’s inducement is the conceptual ana-
log of an intentional tort, then traditional doctrines shaped by 
Sony are conceptual analogs of negligence and products liabil-
ity. Remember that Sony’s assessment of noninfringing uses 
essentially asks whether a defendant’s conduct is reasonable. If 
a technology has sufficient noninfringing uses, then it is rea-
sonable to make and sell it. If those uses are lacking, selling the 
technology is unreasonable and liability follows. 
Courts need to apply inducement narrowly because broad 
application will destroy the nuanced analysis established by 
Sony and endorsed in Grokster. Many, if not all, manufacturers 
of technology stand in positions similar to those occupied by 
manufacturers of socially valuable products because technology 
makers know that someone will eventually use their products 
to infringe. If courts adopt a broad interpretation of induce-
ment, then substantial certainty about the consequence of in-
fringement will be enough to establish third-party copyright li-
ability, even in cases where the defendants make technology 
with substantial noninfringing uses. Such a result would make 
no sense because it would destroy our ability to distinguish be-
tween culpable defendants who sell technology with no legiti-
mate uses and innocent defendants who sell technology with 
legitimate uses. These defendants can be separated only if the 
law is sensitive to the presence of noninfringing uses in cases 
where defendants do not want infringement to occur. Courts 
must therefore limit the reach of intentional inducement in or-
der to preserve the nuances associated with the Sony rule, just 
as they limit the reach of battery to preserve the nuances of 
negligence and products liability.259 
 
jury. Employees generally fight these motions for dismissal by claiming that 
the employer deliberately or intentionally injured the employee because the 
employer knew with substantial certainty that its behavior would cause injury 
to an employee. Courts sometimes accept this argument, suggesting that 
“knowledge with substantial certainty” makes otherwise negligent conduct in-
tentional. However, these cases are better understood as defining the scope of 
workers’ compensation and not the general shape of tort law. See Suarez v. 
Dickmont Plastics Corp., 639 A.2d 507, 508 (Conn. 1994); Turner v. PCR, Inc., 
754 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 2000), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. 
§ 440.11(1)(b) (2003), as recognized in Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR Inc., 889 
So. 2d 779, 781 & n.1, 784 n.5 (Fla. 2004); Sherner v. Conoco, Inc., 995 P.2d 
990, 998–99 (Mont. 2000); Birklid v. Boeing Co., 904 P.2d 278, 280–81 (Wash. 
1995). 
 259. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 
2764, 2781 n.12 (2005) (“Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a 
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Supporters of expansive third-party copyright liability will 
understandably balk at the suggestion made here. In their 
opinion, cases like Sony are far too lenient on defendants be-
cause they leave behind loopholes to be exploited by cynical 
faulty defendants. Expansive interpretations of third-party 
copyright liability are therefore necessary, they argue, because 
those interpretations make it possible to hold all faulty defen-
dants liable. These supporters acknowledge the exposure of in-
nocent defendants to liability and the suppression of nonin-
fringing behavior as unfortunate, but they argue that these 
consequences are less important than guaranteeing the secu-
rity of copyright against cynically faulty behavior. It is there-
fore important for courts to follow the lead of cases like Fono-
visa and interpret contributory liability and inducement as 
broadly as possible. 
To be sure, the arguments suggested here have some ap-
peal, but Grokster has accounted for them rather well. The ar-
gument in favor of expansive liability operates from a concern 
that cynical defendants will deliberately encourage infringe-
ment in hopes of profiting from it. This is exactly what hap-
pened in Fonovisa, where the defendants purposefully helped 
infringers hide their identities in order to protect the rental 
fees paid by infringers.260 There is, however, no longer much 
need to interpret third-party copyright liability expansively to 
catch these defendants because a properly limited inducement 
cause of action can do so with a much smaller risk of unfortu-
nate consequences. 
Remember that the touchstone of inducement is the delib-
erate promotion of infringement by others.261 Inducement will 
therefore impose liability on many, if not all, of the cynical de-
fendants whose behavior justifies the expansive interpretation 
of third-party copyright liability, and it will accomplish this 
 
court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based 
on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device 
otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would 
tread too close to the Sony safe harbor.”); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 
250, at 1138–43 (discussing the importance of limiting the reach of intentional 
torts based on substantial certainty); Sebok, supra note 250, at 1172–73 (iden-
tifying problems with intent based on substantial certainty and advocating its 
elimination). 
 260. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (E.D. 
Cal. 1994), rev’d, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 261. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777–78; supra text accompanying note 221 
(quoting Grokster). 
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task with relatively few unfortunate side effects. Fonovisa’s ex-
pansive interpretation of contributory liability successfully held 
cynically faulty defendants liable, but it paved the way for 
claims against all kinds of innocent defendants like Internet 
service providers, credit card companies, and even the electric 
company.262 If the Fonovisa court had applied inducement to its 
cynical defendants, it would likely have found them liable be-
cause the defendants behaved in a manner deliberately calcu-
lated to assist infringers.263 However, the same reasoning 
would not have exposed Internet service providers, credit card 
companies, or the electric company to liability because none of 
them wants infringement to occur. In short, Grokster effectively 
eliminated the need for expansive interpretations of contribu-
tory liability by endorsing inducement, a cause of action that 
achieves the goals of expansive contributory liability with far 
fewer undesirable side effects.264 This answers the concerns of 
those who argue for the expansive interpretation of third-party 
copyright liability. 
 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 162–69 (analyzing the effects of an 
expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liability). 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 109–16, 202 (describing the Fono-
visa defendants’ behavior and the court’s perception that the defendants were 
cynically culpable). 
 264. This Article does not claim that every expansive third-party copyright 
liability case was correctly decided. Indeed, some of those cases were mistakes 
that could have been avoided if courts had used the analytical tools suggested 
here. For example, consider the finding of vicarious liability against Malone in 
Motorvations Inc. v. M&M Inc., No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617 (D. Utah 
July 6, 2001). Recall that Malone was held vicariously liable for infringement 
committed by the advertiser Whipple despite never dealing with Whipple at 
all. The court justified finding liability against Malone because it was afraid 
that other defendants would take advantage of an ambiguity in the law to es-
cape liability. Id. The court’s solution was to interpret the law so that Malone 
was liable. See supra note 202 (discussing Motorvations). Motorvations is trou-
bling because it holds a defendant vicariously liable for the infringement of 
another despite having only a remote business relationship with the infringer. 
The court’s motivation for doing so is perfectly understandable, but the results 
make overbroad liability far too likely. This problem could have been avoided 
by using the framework suggested by this Article. Malone would probably 
have escaped vicarious liability because it did not have a respondeat superior 
relationship with Whipple. Also, Malone would probably have escaped in-
ducement and contributory liability because it neither wanted infringement to 
occur nor acted in an unreasonably careless manner. At the same time, the 
court would not have had to worry as much about future cynical defendants 
escaping liability because those defendants would likely want infringement to 
occur. The court could have accordingly used inducement to impose liability on 
those defendants. 
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C. THE IMPROVED CONSTRUCTION OF THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT 
LIABILITY 
It is now possible to summarize the improved construction 
of third-party copyright liability after Grokster. There are now 
three causes of action for such liability: vicarious liability, con-
tributory liability, and inducement. In the vast majority of 
cases, the existence of liability depends on a showing that the 
defendant is at fault. This means that contributory liability and 
inducement will govern most third-party copyright liability 
cases, with vicarious liability limited to those cases where 
agency principles such as respondeat superior would impose 
strict liability on defendants. Additionally, courts should apply 
contributory liability and inducement conservatively. In par-
ticular, courts must avoid interpreting contributory liability in 
expansive ways that expose innocent defendants to liability and 
suppress noninfringing behavior. Instead, courts should make 
sure that the law of contributory liability remains sensitive to 
the culpability of defendants and the social costs and benefits 
associated with their behavior. Finally, inducement should be 
found only when the defendant acts for the express purpose of 
encouraging infringement. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to 
recover when a defendant simply knows with substantial cer-
tainty that his behavior will support infringement. Such a con-
struction of the law is flawed because it would destroy the sen-
sitive balancing that must occur when the defendant does not 
deliberately want infringement to occur. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article began with a description of third-party copy-
right liability before Grokster. It showed that pre-Grokster law 
had an inconsistent structure that led to significantly divergent 
interpretations of the law. This divergence made the law inco-
herent because plaintiffs and defendants alike could never be 
sure what line of cases the courts would apply. The Article then 
analyzed Grokster and showed that the Supreme Court has 
made significant choices that imply a limited construction of 
third-party copyright liability. To be sure, some will not agree 
about whether the Supreme Court’s choices are normatively 
desirable, and they will argue for a return to expansive third-
party liability. However, the Article has shown that the limited 
approach described here will accomplish many of the objectives 
that inspire expansive liability with far fewer negative conse-
quences. 
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Of course, it would be foolish to claim that Grokster has 
settled all controversies related to third-party copyright liabil-
ity, and no such claim is made here. Even if courts adopt the 
construction of third-party copyright liability proposed here, 
many unresolved questions will remain. For example, vicarious 
liability may have a limited role in third-party copyright liabil-
ity, but the precise contours of its limits are not clear. The doc-
trine’s origins in respondeat superior suggest that such liability 
could be limited to employers being sued for infringement 
committed by their employees.265 Nonetheless, it is conceivable 
that courts will identify other limits that would not overwhelm 
the fault-based construction of the law. Similarly, contributory 
liability may now become the dominant doctrine in third-party 
copyright liability, but that doctrine does not identify the kinds 
of behavior that future courts will find unreasonable. Individu-
als pursuing legitimate objectives will inevitably expose copy-
right holders to the risk of infringement, and victims of in-
fringement will claim that defendants should have done more 
to protect copyright. It remains to be seen whether courts will 
give defendants the duty to affirmatively thwart infringement 
or whether the honest pursuit of legitimate objectives will be 
found reasonable.266 Finally, courts will surely face unknown 
difficulties when they are asked to begin applying the doctrine 
of inducement. 
All of these challenges are significant, and there will be 
others as well. Nevertheless, the intellectual foundations pro-
vided by Grokster represent a distinct improvement over those 
available before Grokster. If nothing else, the construction of 
third-party copyright liability offered here will give courts a co-
herent framework that encourages courts to approach difficult 
issues in a cogent, reasonably consistent way. It is this Article’s 
hope that decisions made within this framework will, in the 
long run, benefit society. 
 
 265. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (arguing that vicarious li-
ability should be limited to the contours of respondeat superior). 
 266. See David G. Post et al., “Nice Questions” Unanswered: Grokster, 
Sony’s Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine, and the Deferred Verdict on Inter-
net File Sharing, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 235, 257–61 (describing questions 
left unanswered by Grokster); Christine Pope, Note, Unfinished Business: Are 
Today’s P2P Networks Liable for Copyright Infringement?, 2005 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 22, ¶¶ 29–36, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/ 
2005DLTR0022.pdf (surveying post-Grokster ambiguity in the law). 
